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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The pur-
pose of the Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
Bjorgen v. Kinsey
In Bjorgen v. Kinsey,' Robert W. Kinsey and his professional
corporation appealed from a district court judgment that found
him guilty of fraud, deceit, and legal malpractice.2 From March
1983 to November 1983 and from October 1984 to December
1984, Kinsey had been retained by Anita Bjorgen for the purpose
of reviewing a proposed property settlement agreement and rep-
resenting her in a new divorce action against her husband, Lyle
Bjorgen.' Kinsey was familiar with Lyle Bjorgen's financial status
because Kinsey was a member on the First National Bank of
Crosby's (Bank) board of directors which had recently approved
loans to Lyle.4
During Kinsey's representation of Anita, Kinsey also provided
legal services for the Bank that included the overseeing of an
action against Lyle.5 The action related to the calling back of
notes Lyle owed the Bank, mainly due to the fact that the Bank
believed that Lyle's pending divorce would significantly impair
the Bank's prospect of getting repaid.6 Lyle recommended that
the bank pursue Lyle's "equity in his real estate."'7 The Bank
eventually organized a sheriff's sale of the property, in which the
bank purchased the property.8
In November of 1984, Anita received a homestead exemp-
tion.9 In November of 1986, Anita filed a suit against Kinsey and
his professional corporation, based on legal malpractice, contend-
ing that there was a conflict of interest and that she should be
awarded treble damages pursuant to section 27-13-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.), which is the penalty for attor-
ney deceit. 10 Kinsey was found guilty by a jury for deceit, fraud,
and collusion against Anita and the trial court trebled the $172,000
compensatory damages pursuant to the statute. 1 However, the
1. 466 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1991).
2. Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d 553, 554 (N.D. 1991).
3. Id. at 555-57. Although Anita instructed Kinsey to dismiss the divorce suit in August
of 1983, she retained Kinsey in October of 1984 to reinstate the divorce action, which was
followed through by a December 1984 divorce judgment. Id.
4. Id. at 555.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Bjorgen, 466 N.W.2d at 555.
8. Id. at 556.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 557. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-13-08 (1991) (allowing treble damages to be
awarded in a civil action for attorney misconduct).
11. Bjorgen, 466 N.W.2d at 557.
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judge disallowed the punitive damage award. The judge also
denied Kinsey's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, a new trial, and relief from the judgment. 2 Kinsey appealed
the decision.' 3 Anita cross-appealed the denial of punitive
damages. 14
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Kinsey con-
tended that the trial court erred by striking his affirmative defense
that the legal malpractice action was barred by the two-year stat-
ute of limitations pursuant to section 28-01-18(3) of the N.D.G.C.'15
The supreme court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
the continuous representation rule applied, which tolls the statute
of limitations in a legal malpractice case when, as in this case, the
lawyer "'continues to represent the client and the representation
relates to the same transaction or subject matter as the allegedly
negligent acts.' "16 Alternatively, the supreme court held that the
fraud allegation in Anita's complaint triggered a six-year statute of
limitations period.' 7
The court also concluded that there was substantial evidence
in the record to support the jury's conclusion that Kinsey was the
proximate cause of the damages.' 8 The court based this conclusion
on evidence which indicated that had Kinsey followed Anita's
instructions to convey the property to her, the Bank would not
have attached the property. 9
Next, Kinsey maintained on appeal that section 27-13-08 of
the N.D.C.C., which is the statute that awards civil treble damages
against attorneys for misconduct, is inapplicable unless he is first
convicted. 20 The supreme court reviewed decisions from other
jurisdictions and held that a criminal conviction did not necessarily
have to precede the use of the statute's civil remedy.2 '
As for Kinsey's contention that contributory negligence was a
defense in a legal malpractice action, the court agreed, but also
made clear that the "trial court need not instruct the jury on issues
or matters not warranted by the evidence. ' 22 In this case the
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1991).
16. Bjorgen, 553 N.W.2d at 557 (quoting Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758, 762 (N.D.
1986)).
17. Id. at 558.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 559.
21. Bjorgen, 466 N.W.2d at 559.
22. Id.
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court concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to
inform the jury on the issues of contributory negligence and miti-
gation of damages because Anita had not acted negligently.23
The supreme court also upheld the trial court's refusal to
grant Kinsey a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Kin-
sey believed the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. 4 The
court concluded that no fraudulent conveyance had occurred
because the transfer rendered no one insolvent.25
The supreme court also refused to grant Kinsey any relief of
judgment based on his assertion that making him pay after she set-
tled with the bank constituted a double recovery.26 The court
concluded that because Anita settled an independent action on
substantially different issues than the case at hand, Kinsey failed to
prove double recovery.27
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court's denial
of punitive damages because it resulted in a duplicative recov-
ery.28 The judgment and post trial orders were affirmed.29
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Rudnick v. City of Jamestown
Gerald Rudnick, in Rudnick v. City of Jamestown,30 appealed
a district court judgment which denied his request to enjoin the
City of Jamestown from demoting him.31 Rudnick claimed that
the process used to demote him violated his due process rights.32
Mr. Rudnick was demoted because he left his assigned duties as a
police officer to operate his snow removal business.33 The city
cross-appealed, claiming the district court did not have jurisdiction
to hear Rudnick's claim because there was no statutory appeal
allowed from the findings of the Discipline Review Board and the
23. Id. at 560. The court held that there was nothing in the record to support Kinsey's
contentions that Anita was contributorily negligent by having specialized knowledge and
by her failure to fire Kinsey. Id.
24. Id. at 560.
25. Id.
26. Bjorgen, 466 N.W.2d at 561.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 562.
29. Id. In concurrence, Justice Levine reiterated the court's conclusion that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kinsey relief from the judgment because he
presented no persuasive evidence to support his argument to the contrary. Id. (Levine J.,
concurring specially in result).
30. 463 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1990).
31. Rudnick v. City of Jamestown, 463 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1990).
32. Id. at 635.
33. Id. at 633.
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Civil Service Commission.34
The supreme court disagreed with the defendant's characteri-
zation that Mr. Rudnick's claim was an appeal.35 Instead, they
viewed Rudnick's claim as an independent action to review the
constitutionality of the City of Jamestown's demotion process.36
The court stated that "whether or not constitutional guarantees
are violated is a question for the courts. '37 Further, the court
noted that the determination of whether or not the City of James-
town's disciplinary procedures complied with due process, was
fully reviewable by the district court.
The North Dakota Supreme Court cited to the case of Cleve-
land Board of Education v. Loudermill3 8 which outlined the spe-
cific requirement of a hearing which serves to preserve due
process rights.3 9 To ensure protection of due process rights, it must
be shown that the deprived party had notice of the pending depri-
vation and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of
life, liberty or property.4 ° The hearing "need not be elaborate, but
should be an initial check against mistaken decisions."' 4 1 Mr. Rud-
nick was given written notice of the charges against him prior to
his demotion.42 He was also given a pretermination hearing in
front of the Disciplinary Review Board.43 Rudnick was given the
opportunity to present his side of the case and explain his conduct.
This notice and hearing would have been enough to satisfy the due
process requirements. Nevertheless, Mr. Rudnick was also given
post-termination hearings by the Civil Service Commission.4 4 The
court held that Rudnick was not "entitled to any greater due pro-
cess protections, '45 and therefore, the judgment of the district
court was upheld.46
City of Bismarck v. Schoppert
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in City of Bismarck v.
Schoppert,47 reversed the disorderly conduct conviction of Mr.
34. Id. at 635.
35. Id. at 636.
36. Rudnick, 463 N.W.2d at 636.
37. Id.
38. 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1984).
39. Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1984).
40. Id. at 542.
41. Id. at 545.
42. Rudnick, 463 N.W.2d at 639.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 641.
47. 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1991).
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Schoppert.4" The court held that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain a disorderly conduct conviction because Mr. Schoppert's
language did not tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. 9
Mr. Schoppert "gestured with his middle finger" and called a
police officer a "fucking, bitching cop," as he walked past the car
in which she and a volunteer police chaplain were sitting.50 The
officer began to follow Schoppert in her car.5' The officer asked
him what was the matter and Schoppert continued his barrage of
obscenities.52 Schoppert was subsequently arrested and charged
with violating Bismarck City Ordinance 6-05-01(3).- 3
The sum of Shoppert's argument was that the city ordinance,
as applied to him, was unconstitutional.5 4 The court concluded
that the City of Bismarck likely derived its ordinance language
from the language in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.55 However,
the court determined that the phrase in Chaplinsky which prohib-
its language which "inflicts injury" has never been given
independent significance. 6 Chaplinsky rested on the phrase
which prohibited use of words which "tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.15 7 The United States Supreme Court in Ter-
miniello v. Chicago,5 8 held that "to withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, the ordinance must be aimed at speech 'shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest.' ,,51
Therefore, only if Schoppert's words "tended to incite a
breach of the peace" could he constitutionally be found guilty of
disorderly conduct. Both officers stated that, although Schoppert's
48. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1991).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 809.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 809. Bismarck Ordinance 6-05-01(3) (1991) provides:
Disorderly Conduct. A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another
person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by his behavior, that person ...
3. In a public place, uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture, which language or gesture by its very utterance or gesture inflicts injury
or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace....
Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 809 n.l.
54. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 810.
55. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
56. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 810.
57. Id.
58. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
59. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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words angered them, it did not incite them to breach the peace.6 °
In Lewis v. New Orleans, 61 Justice Powell stated that "words may
or may not be 'fighting words,' depending upon the circumstances
of their utterance" and the fact that the words are spoken to police
is a "significant circumstance. '62 The city made no showing that
Schoppert's words tended to incite breach of the peace. 3 Thus,
the court held that without this essential element of the crime,
Schoppert's conviction must be reversed.64
Chief Justice Erickstad reluctantly concurred with the opin-
ion.65 Erickstad believed that Mr. Schoppert's behavior came
close to violating the duties of an attorney as enumerated in sec-
tion 27-13-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. Justice Vande
Walle also concurred specially with the court's decision.6 6 Vande
Walle based his concurrence on the evidence concerning the
sequence of events which led to Mr. Schoppert's remarks toward
Officer Elhard. 7 Justice Vande Walle conceded that while Mr.
Schoppert's first remark to the officer was offensive, without more,
it was not enough to convict Mr. Schoppert of disorderly con-
duct. 68 He also stated that the subsequent remarks could be char-
acterized as provoked, as Officer Elhard had followed Schoppert
after the first comment. 9
City of Jamestown v. Beneda
In City of Jamestown v. Beneda,7 ° the Supreme Court of
North Dakota held that the city ownership of a shopping mall con-
stituted state action, which subjected the mall authorities to com-
port with First Amendment guarantees when the mall authorities
attempted to regulate speech.7 '
Abortion protesters peaceably assembled on the second floor
of a Jamestown shopping mall for the "sole purpose of expressing
their views on the abortion issue."'72 This protest took place in the
hallway near a doctors medical office.73 The protestors did not
60. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 813.
61. 415 U.S. 130 (1973).
62. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1973).
63. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 813.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 813 (Erickstad, C.J., concurring specially).
66. Id. at 814 (Vande Walle, J., concurring specially).
67. Id.
68. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 815.
69. Id.
70. 477 N.W.2d 830 (N.D. 1991).
71. City of Jamestown v. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d 830, 838 (N.D. 1991).
72. Id. at 834.
73. Id. at 833.
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hinder or threaten any client coming or going from the doctors
office.7 4 Nevertheless, the mall had a regulation that prohibited all
expressive activity with a penalty of criminal trespass.7 5 The
protestors were arrested and convicted for violating the regula-
tion.76 The protestors appealed, maintaining that the mall's regu-
lation against expressive activity violated their First Amendment
guarantees of free speech and assembly. The supreme court
noted that the constitutional guarantees that are found in the first
amendment only protect against abridgment by the "government,
federal or state," and not against an abridgment by private enti-
ties.78 The court used the following test to determine if the protes-
tors' convictions were in violation of their First Amendment
rights: "First, we must determine whether the regulation of the
appellants' expressive activity by the Jamestown mall constitutes
state action. Second, if state action is involved, we must then char-
acterize the forum involved to establish the constitutional stan-
dard by which we judge the mall's regulation of expressive
activity. 79
Applying this test, the supreme court recognized that the
Jamestown mall was owned by the city, but that the city had
"assigned its interest in the property" to a developer.8 0 After
reviewing relevant case law, the supreme court found that the
regulation of speech by the mall authorities constituted state
action because the city could not "sweep aside state action"
merely by leasing or assigning the property to private
individuals.8 '
Thereafter, because state action was found, the court contin-
ued its analysis by reviewing case law to determine the forum
involved. 2 The court concluded that the "common walkways and
public areas" of the Jamestown mall were the "functional
equivalent of the city streets, squares, and parks of earlier days,"
and, therefore, constituted a public forum. 3 Further, the court
held that the "all-encompassing ban on expressive activity" in the
public forum was "facially overbroad and in violation of the First
74. Id.
75. Id. Expressive activity included: speech making, soliciting, loitering, picketing,
etc. Id.
76. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d at 833.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 834.
79. Id. at 835.
80. Id. at 832.
81. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d at 836.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 837-38.
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Amendment," because the regulation was content-based and did
not serve a compelling state interest.84 The court reversed
because the trespass convictions infringed upon the protestors'
First Amendment rights.8
CRIMINAL LAW
State v. Vogel
In State v. Vogel,86 the Supreme Court of North Dakota held
that including language from section 39-20-07(5) of North Dakota
Century Code (N.D.C.C.), which deals with the judge's function of
admitting evidence of chemical tests in a jury instruction without
telling the jury how to weigh the evidence of a chemical test, was
improper.8 7
"
When Vogel was found at about 1:00 a.m. by two officers, he
was sleeping in his car. The headlights on Vogel's vehicle were on
and the engine was running.8 After awakening Vogel, the police
officers arrested him for actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. The officers
made the arrest because Vogel "smelled of alcohol" and was
"unintelligible in responding to questions."8 9 An intoxilyzer test
administered to Vogel at the jail revealed a blood alcohol content
of 0.13 of one percent.9 ° The police officers charged him with
driving under the influence pursuant to section 39-08-01(1) of the
N.D.C.C.9" A jury trial was held and Vogel was convicted.9"
Vogel appealed contending "that the jury instructions created an
unconstitutional 'mandatory irrebuttable presumption' that
shifted the burden of proof to him."9 3
The supreme court noted that the jury instruction given had
incorporated section 39-20-07(3) of the N.D.C.C. and thus aided in
defining "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" as the
"accused having a blood alcohol concentration of at least ten-one
hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the perform-
ance of a chemical test."'94 Considering the legislative history sur-
84. Id. at 838.
85. Id.
86. 467 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1991).
87. State v. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d 86, 93 (N.D. 1991).
88. Id. at 87.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 88. See also N.D. CENT. CODE. § 39-08-01(1Xb) (1987 & Supp. 1991) (driving
under the influence statute).
92. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d at 88.
93. Id.
94. ld. at 89.
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rounding the enactment of section 39-20-07(3) of the N.D.C.C, the
court stated that this enactment was intended as a per se strict
liability statute.95 Further, the court held that the prosecution
must prove each element of the detailed definition "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."96 As a result, the effect of the statutory definition
did not create an "unconstitutional presumption" that shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant on any elements.97
Despite that the court found no shift in the burden of proof
under the statute, the court held that the jury instruction imper-
missibly shifted the burden to the defendant to "disprove fair
administration" of the intoxilyzer test.98 Because the jury's instruc-
tions in this case incorporated section 39-20-07(5) of the N.D.C.C.,
which deals with the judges function of admitting evidence of
chemical tests into evidence, the court concluded that Vogel's
rights were substantially prejudiced when the court failed to sub-
sequently inform the jury of its function to determine what weight
and credibility to give to the evidence presented. 99 As a result,
the court held that the "effect of this instruction shifted the bur-
den of disputing the test results to Vogel."' 00 The court reversed
and remanded for a new trial with proper instructions to the
jury.' 0 l
State v. Taillon
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in State v. Taillon,1°2
noted that the standard of review used to overturn a trial court's
decision on the voluntariness of a confession is whether the trial
court's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,
or whether under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's
determination is wrong as a matter of law.10 3
In Taillon, the defendant complied with a request to come to
the police station for questioning. 10 4 The defendant was given
Miranda warnings at the police station, even though the defendant
was not in custody.'0 5 An interrogation took place in a small room
with the defendant sitting with his "back against the wall, the door
95. Id.
96. Id. at 90.
97. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d at 90.
98. Id. at 93.
99. Id. at 92-93.
100. Id. at 92.
101. Id. at 93.
102. 470 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1991).
103. State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 230 (N.D. 1991).
104. Id. at 227.
105. Id. at 229.
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closed and the investigator two feet away."'1  The defendant was
questioned for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes. 1 7
Within that time, the defendant expressed his wish to remain
silent, which was disregarded by the police interrogator. In addi-
tion, the interrogation was not discontinued when the defendant
requested the services of a lawyer.' 08 The conduct of the police
throughout the course of the interrogation, which included the use
of sympathy, paternalism and coercion, encouraged the defendant
to continue the interrogation despite the defendant's assertion of
his Fifth Amendment rights.'0 9 The trial court suppressed the
incriminating statements obtained from this interview concluding
that they were involuntary. 01 The trial court maintained that the
defendant was psychologically coerced to continue the interview,
which was demonstrated when the investigator ignored the
defendant's invocation of his rights to silence and to have an attor-
ney. This made the defendant's statements involuntary."' The
state appealed." 2
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the evidence
sustained the trial court's decision that the confession was involun-
tary. 113 After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the
court determined that the trial court's decision was not contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence." 4 In turn, the trial court's
suppression order was affirmed." 5
State v. Woehlhoff
In State v. Woehlhoff,116 Courtney WoehIlhoff appealed his
conviction of theft contending that: 1) the amended information
that was filed prior to the jury trial denied him his constitutional
right to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"
facing him; 1 7 2) the search warrant issued to search his vehicle
106. Id. The supreme court noted that Miranda warnings are required when the
"individual is subject to custodial interrogation." Id.
107. Id.
108. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d at 227-28.
109. Id. at 229-30.
110. Id. at 230.
111. Id. at 228. An involuntary confession is a confession given when the defendant's
will is overborne, as in the case at hand, and not by the defendant's free choice. Id.
112. Id.
113. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d at 230.
114. Id. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue of whether a statement is voluntary
or not is determined with great deference to the trial court decision on the issue of
voluntariness, because the trial court does not look at a cold record. Id. As a result, the
supreme court does not conduct a de novo review on the issue of voluntariness. Id.
115. Id.
116. 473 N.W.2d 446 (N.D. 1991).
117. State v. Woehlhoff, 473 N.W.2d 446, 447 (N.D. 1991).
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was invalid because it did not comport with the Fourth Amend-
ment;"' 8 3) he had ineffective assistance of counsel;" 9 4) he was
criminally tried in a court that lacked jurisdiction; 20 and 5) the
trial judge's statements at sentencing regarding his prior criminal
record demonstrated that the judge was prejudiced. 12  An arrest
and search warrant was issued after the police investigated a tip
that Woehlhoff was trying to sell the all-terrain vehicle (ATV)
which was located in the bed of his pickup. 2 Woehlhoff was
arrested and charged with theft. 23 Woehlhoff was convicted on
charges that he was knowingly in the possession a of a stolen ATV,
with the intention to dispossess the owner of the property. 4
Woehloff appealed.'25
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the conten-
tion that the amended information that was filed prior to the jury
trial denied Woelhoff's constitutional right to be "informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation" facing him. The court
cited to the identical language in both Rule 7(e) of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 7(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which allow the amendment of an
information "at any time before a verdict or finding, if no addi-
tional or different offense is charged and substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced."'1 26 The initial information charge
stated that "Woehlhoff knowingly 'receives, retains, or disposes of
property .... "7 The court held that the deletion of the initial
allegations that Woehlhoff "received" or "disposed" of the ATV in
the amended information, prior to the trial, while keeping the lan-
guage that Woehlhoff "retained" the ATV, did not violate the
above stated Rules and that the canceled words were
"surplusage.' 28
Woehlhoff's contention that the search warrant was invalid
was not considered by the court because the issue was improperly
before the court.129 Relying on precedent, the court concluded
that when the defendant fails to make a pretrial motion to sup-
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 447-48.
121. Id. at 448.
122. Woehlhoff, 473 N.W.2d at 447.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 448.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 448. See N.D. R. CrM. P. 7(e) (criteria that allows an information to be
amended); FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(e) (criteria that allows the information to be amended).
127. Woehihoff, 473 N.W.2d at 448.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 449. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)3, 12(f), and 41(e) (challenging the validity
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press illegally obtained evidence, the defendant cannot raise the
issue on appeal. 130
The court believed Woehlhoff's contention that he had inef-
fective assistance of counsel could be best resolved "at a full hear-
ing before the trial court in a post-conviction hearing."'3 1 The
court noted that a motion to suppress the evidence garnered from
the search warrant may have been proper, but it did not deter-
mine whether the failure to do so constituted ineffectiveness of
counsel. 132
The contention that Woehlhoff had been tried in the wrong
county was discredited when the court emphasized that the
charge was "knowingly retaining stolen property," as opposed to
knowingly receiving stolen property.' 33 The court noted that
Rule 18 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
governs the location of criminal trials in North Dakota, requires
the trial to be held in the county that the offense was commit-
ted. 3 4 In the instant case, Woehlhoff was charged with "know-
ingly retaining stolen property" in Morton County, which was the
county he was properly convicted in by the trial court.'35
Lastly, the court discredited Woehlhoff's contention that the
trial judge was biased by considering his past convictions at the
time of sentencing. 136 The court noted that section 12.1-32-04 of
the North Dakota Century Code expects judges to consider a
defendant's prior criminal record at sentencing, and the section
also "tolerates" the apparent prejudice because the defendant has
created the bias through the defendant's own prior behavior.' 37 As
of search warrants on appeal requires the defendant to first raise the issue before or during
the trial).
130. Woehlhoff, 473 N.W.2d at 449.
131. Id. at 450. The court outlined a procedure to review allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel and stated that:
(1) Any defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal from the judgment of conviction even though the issue has not
been raised in the trial court. We will review the entire record on appeal and if
we can say that the defendant has been denied the effective assistance of
counsel, we will reverse and remand for a new trial. (2) If we are unable to
conclude from the record on appeal that the defendant's trial counsel was
ineffective, and if we affirm the judgment of conviction without prejudice to the
defendant's right to raise the ineffective-assistance of counsel issue via
appropriate post-conviction proceedings.
Id. at 449.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 450.
134. Id.
135. Woehlhoff, 473 N.W.2d at 450.
136. Id.
137. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04 (1985) (this section allows judges to
consider at sentencing the defendants' history of criminal activity, whether the defendant
1992] 769
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
a result the judgment of the trial court was affirmed and the issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel was left for post-conviction
proceedings. 138
CRIMINAL LAW/DOUBLE JEOPARDY
City of Dickinson v. Kraft
In City of Dickinson v. Kraft,139 the issue was whether the
trial court's judgment of acquittal, as distinguished from a dismis-
sal, was appropriate. 140
The City of Dickinson charged the defendant, Kraft, with vio-
lating a city ordinance prohibiting the dispensing of alcoholic bev-
erages to a minor and allowing the minor to remain on the
premises which was licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. 14 1 An
"essential element" of the crime was to prove that Kraft was the
license holder of the premises. 142 The city failed to prove to the
trial court that Kraft was the license holder of the premises on the
date of the alleged violation. 143 The trial court entered a judg-
ment of acquittal and the city appealed.144 Kraft sought a dismis-
sal of the appeal. 145
In spite of the trial court judgment of acquittal, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota noted that the determination of what con-
stitutes an acquittal does not rest on the trial court's "characteriza-
tion of the ruling," but rather on the "substance of the judge's
ruling.' 46 The substance of an acquittal constitutes resolving a
factual element of the offense charged to the benefit of the
defendant and to the total loss of the state, who has the burden to
prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.147 An acquittal
can not be retried. 14  To retry a true acquittal would constitute
double jeopardy. 149 In the instant case, the supreme court held
that since the trial court's decision of acquittal was based on insuffi-
cient evidence, the acquittal was a true one. 150 The court further
lived a law-abiding life, and whether the history indicates the possibilities that the
defendant may commit another crime).
138. Woehlhoff, 447 N.W.2d at 450.
139. 472 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1991).
140. City of Dickinson v. Kraft, 472 N.W.2d 441, 443 (N.D. 1991).
141. Id. at 441-42.
142. Id. at 442.
143. Id. at 444.
144. Id. at 442.
145. Kraft, 472 N.W.2d at 442.
146. Id. at 443.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Kraft, 472 N.W.2d at 444.
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held that a state may only appeal cases that satisfy the dictates of
the section 29-28-07 of the North Dakota Century Code.'' Thus
the court dismissed the appeal.1
5 2
State v. Robideaux
In State v. Robideaux,15 3 Darrell Robideaux appealed from
the order of the district court denying his motion to dismiss the
charge against him of manslaughter based on double jeopardy.'5 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding
that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 55 The
court's jurisdiction to hear appeals is set out in section 29-28-06 of
the North Dakota Century Code. 156 This statute states that an
appeal may be taken from "1. [a] verdict of guilty; 2. [a] final judg-
ment of conviction; 3. [a]n order refusing a motion in arrest of
judgment; 4. [a]n order denying a motion for a new trial; or 5. [a]n
order made after a judgment affecting any substantial right of the
party.' 5 7 There had been no order, judgment or verdict from
which to appeal in Mr. Robideaux's case. This statute does not
allow the court to hear appeals from a denial of a defendant's
motion to dismiss the prosecution against him.' 58
However, the court did briefly discuss the double jeopardy
issue.' 59 Mr. Robideaux was charged with leaving the scene of the
accident and with manslaughter.' 60 He pled guilty to leaving the
scene. 16  Robideaux claimed that in proving the manslaughter
charges, the state must prove the entirety of the leaving-the-scene
conduct for which Robideaux had previously been charged.1
6 2
The court stated that the two crimes of manslaughter and leaving
the scene are transactionally separate and distinct. 63 The court
also stated that the crime of leaving the scene of an accident can
occur only after the accident has already taken place.' 6 4 There-
151. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE. § 29-28-07 (1991) (showing what cases a state may
appeal).
152. Kraft, 472 N.W.2d at 444. In concurrence, Justice Vande Walle pointed out that
even if the trial court granted an acquittal on "erroneous evidentiary rulings," a retrial was
still barred. Id. (Vande Walle, J., concurring).
153. 475 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 1991).
154. State v. Robideaux, 475 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 1991).
155. Id.
156. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-06 (1991).
157. Robideaux, 475 N.W.2d at 916.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 915-16.
161. Id. at 915.
162. Robideaux, 475 N.W.2d at 917.
163. Id. at 918.
164. Id.
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fore, the court held that if the matter was appropriately before
them, they would have concluded that "the conduct underlying
Robideaux's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident is not
the same conduct that the State will rely on to prove the elements
necessary to support a manslaughter conviction.'
'1 65
CRIMINAL LAW/TRESPASS
State v. Sahr
In State v. Sahr,'66 the defendants were convicted of criminal
trespass for "blocking the entries" to an abortion clinic in Fargo,
North Dakota.16 7 One defendant, Dennis W. Uchtman, had also
been convicted of criminal trespass for an abortion protest in
Jamestown, North Dakota.' 68 The sentencing court fined each
defendant $35 and deferred imposition of sentencing for one year
of unsupervised probation.' 69 Also, the sentencing court condi-
tioned probation upon restricting the defendants from going
within "one block" of an abortion clinic for one year.17 0 The
defendants appealed contending that the judge erred by denying
their motion to present a necessity defense and by placing
improper conditions on their probation sentences.'7 l This appeal
was consolidated with Mr. Uchtman's appeal, who contended that
his criminal trespass conviction in Jamestown, North Dakota,
should have been dismissed because he did not receive a speedy
trial. 7 2
The Supreme Court of North Dakota stated it would consider
four factors in determining if Mr. Uchtman's right to a speedy trial
had been denied, based on evidence that it had been a year and
five months between the arrest and the trial.' 73 These factors
were "length of delay, reasons for delay, the defendants assertion
of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant.' 7 4
The court held that Mr. Uchtman had received a speedy trial
because within five months of demanding a speedy trial, he
received a trial without any apparent prejudice.' 75
165. Id. at 919.
166. 470 N.W.2d 185 (N.D. 1991).
167. State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185, 186 (N.D. 1991).
168. Id.
169. Id at 186-87. The defendants were not all sentenced by the same court. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d at 187.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 188.
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The next issue the supreme court considered was whether the
trial court erred in denying the defendants an opportunity to pres-
ent evidence on the defense of "necessity" or "choice of evils" to
justify their criminal trespass actions.' 7 6 The court noted that the
defense of necessity has not been recognized in North Dakota and
that the criminal code apparently did not give the judiciary
authority to recognize any "conception" of the necessity
defense.177 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the defendants
were precluded from using the necessity defense to justify crimi-
nal conduct in interfering with abortions because abortions are
constitutionally protected.17 8 Further, the court reasoned that a
necessity defense would require a "legally cognizable" interest. 179
In this case a "lawful abortion" is not a legally cognizable interest
because it is not an unlawful evil, justifying a criminal trespass. 80
Lastly, the court concluded that imposing conditions on pro-
bation "must be such as the court in its discretion deems reason-
ably necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding
life or to assist the defendant to do so."'' In light of this, the court
reviewed other cases that had imposed distant restrictions in pro-
test cases and held that the one-year, one-block condition was rea-
sonable because the conditions promoted rehabilitation while at
the same time allowed the defendants the liberty to protest else-
where. 182  The convictions and sentences were therefore
affirmed. 18 3
DAMAGES
Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh
In Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh,18 4 Karen Slaubaugh appealed a
jury verdict awarding her damages for injuries she sustained in an
176. Id.
177. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d at 191.
178. Id. at 192.
179. Id. at 191.
180. id. at 193.
181. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE. § 12.1-32-07 (1), (2) (1985 & Supp. 1991) (sentencing
may impose reasonably necessary conditions).
.182. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d at 193-94. In special concurrence, Justice Vande Walle held
that unless the United States Supreme Court finds legality in the defendants' position, the
North Dakota Supreme Court is precluded from deciding the case before it. Id. at 196
(Vande Walle, J., concurring specially in the result). Also, Justice Vande Walle believed that
the defenses of justification were not before the court, but rather the cases dealt with the
issue of the extent of evidence that the court believed is necessary to support the various
justification defenses. Id.
183. Id. at 194.
184. 466 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1991).
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automobile accident. 85 The jury awarded Karen damages against
her husband, but dismissed her claims against Pierce County and
Wold Engineering.
86
In the early morning hours of April 13, 1986, Karen Slaubaugh
was involved in a single automobile accident. 187 At the time of the
accident, Mr. Wilmer Slaubaugh was driving and Karen was a pas-
senger. The Slaubaughs were driving out of Rugby on a road
which was under construction.188 Mr. Slaubaugh had been drink-
ing and was driving at an excessive speed.'8" Mr. Slaubaugh drove
through an unmarked "T" intersection and the automobile
crashed into a railroad embankment." ° Karen suffered severe
injuries as a result of the crash. Karen's suit against the road engi-
neer (Wold), Pierce County and Mr. Slaubaugh went to trial. 19'
The jury found Karen forty percent negligent based on the fact
that she was also intoxicated at the time of the accident and her
judgment was therefore diminished. The jury found Mr.
Slaubaugh sixty percent negligent, and awarded Karen damages
for past and future medical expenses, lost wages and permanent
disability. 192
Karen appealed the jury verdict claiming that it was contrary
to the evidence presented.19 3 The supreme court agreed, finding
that the record showed "that various aspects of this jury verdict
are clearly contrary to the evidence."'1 9 4 First, the court found
that the award of $34,000 for past medical expenses was strikingly
inadequate. 195 The parties had stipulated that Karen's expenses
amounted to $68,488.51 and the court found that nothing was
presented to contradict that amount. 19 6
Second, the court found that the jury's failure to award Karen
anything for past or future pain, discomfort, and mental anguish
was clearly contrary to the evidence.' 9 7 The evidence established
that Karen had lost, as a result of the accident, and would never
regain her bladder control, bowel control or sexual sensation.
198
185. Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1991).
186. Id. at 574.
187. Id. at 576.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d at 576.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d at 576.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 577.
198. Id.
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The court stated that failure to make any award under these cir-
cumstances "shocks our judicial conscience." 199
Lastly, the court disagreed with the jury's finding that the
county was not negligent in its failure to post warning signs of
some type to indicate a "T" intersection on the road where
Karen's accident occurred.2 0 0 The jury was instructed that under
North Dakota law, the county was responsible for posting warning
signs. It was clear from the evidence that the county failed to
place any such warnings at the "T" intersection. 20 1 As a result, the
court concluded that, under the circumstances, a new trial on all
questions was warranted. 0 2
DIVORCE
Wright v. Wright
In Wright v. Wright,20 3 Lorin Wright appealed the trial
court's decision which denied his request to modify an original
custody award in a divorce proceeding.20 4 In 1987, Lorin and
Tammy Wright were divorced and the parties agreed that Tammy
was to have "primary physical custody" of their two minor daugh-
ters. 0 5 In 1990, Lorin petitioned the court to award custody of
the two children to him.20 6 The trial judge found that because no
significant change in circumstances had occurred since the origi-
nal custody award, except that Tammy had given birth to twins in
1988, there was no reason for a change in custody.2 °7
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that in order to mod-
ify an original custody award, a two-prong test must be met.20 8
First, there must be a "'significant change of circumstances since
the original divorce decree and custody award.' "209 Second, the
changes have to be such that "'the best interests of the child
would be served by a change in custody.' "210
Reviewing the trial court record, the supreme court held that
"substantial evidence" demonstrated that a significant change of
199. Id.
200. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d at 578.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 463 N.W.2d 654 (N.D. 1990).
204. Wright v. Wright, 463 N.W.2d 654, 654 (N.D. 1990).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 655.
208. Id. at 654-55.
209. Wright, 463 N.W.2d at 655 (citing Wright v. Wright, 431 N.W.2d 301, 303 (N.D.
1988) (standard used to modify an original custody award)).
210. Id. (citing Wright v. Wright, 431 N.W.2d 301, 303 (N.D. 1988)).
1992] 775
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
circumstances had occurred including, "Tammy's suicide
attempts, her drug abuse, and her inappropriate physical disci-
pline, improper care [and] inadequate supervision" of the two
girls. 21 1 Based on these changes, the supreme court concluded
that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. 2  The judg-
ment of the district court was reversed and the case was
remanded.2 13
Ness v. Ness
In Ness v. Ness,214 the Supreme Court of North Dakota consid-
ered the issue of temporary spousal support and held that a tempo-
rary support order in a divorce action continues until the case is
determined or until otherwise ordered by the court.215 In this
instance, the temporary support order continued until the
supreme court appeal process concluded, even though the tempo-
rary support order was silent with regard to its termination and
duration.21 6
The trial court granted a divorce, divided the marital prop-
erty, and awarded spousal support to the wife.2 17 The defendant
husband appealed the trial court's spousal support award, claiming
it was clearly erroneous.2 1 8 While awaiting the post-judgment
appeal process, the husband stopped making temporary support
payments.2 19 Upon remand of that issue, the trial court denied the
wife's motion for continued payments on the basis that the tempo-
rary support order terminated upon the entry of the judgment.2
The wife appealed the denial of this motion.22 '
The supreme court reaffirmed the judgment and noted that a
$5,000 lump-sum award within ninety days from judgment and a
twenty-five percent mineral interest award were properly classi-
fied as spousal support because the trial court provided that the
recipient spouse bear the tax burden, which is a clear indicator of
211. Id. at 655-56.
212. Id. Justice Levine in a special concurrence agreed that the trial court's decision
was clearly erroneous, but believed that the supreme court should not have delved into
weighing the evidence when there was undisputed evidence offered. Id. (Levine, J.,
concurring specially).
213. Id.
214. 467 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1991).
215. Ness v. Ness, 467 N.W.2d 716, 719 (N.D. 1991).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 717.
218. Id. at 718.
219. Id.
220. Ness, 467 N.W.2d at 718.
221. Id.
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spousal support rather than a property settlement.22  After
reviewing the evidence, the supreme court concluded that the
trial court's decision on spousal support was reasonable, and there-
fore, was not clearly erroneous. 2 3
Regarding the issue of whether the temporary spousal support
should continue during the appeal process when the initial decree
was silent as to temporary support, the supreme court reaffirmed
its earlier position that "a temporary support order under our stat-
ute continues in force if an appeal is taken from judgment even
though no reference is made in the judgment continuing the
order. '2 2 4 The supreme court reasoned that if a spouse needs
interim support before trial, the spouse will most likely be in need
of interim support during the pendency of the appeal.225 Thus, the
court remanded this issue for entry of an order directing the hus-
band to pay the wife temporary support for the period of the
appeal process.226
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
State v. Pollack
The North Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Pollack,22 "
addressed three separate issues on appeal from the district
court.22 8 The supreme court upheld the lower court's decision on
all three points.
The court held that section 39-10-71 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code,229 which prohibits fleeing or attempting to elude a
police officer, in any manner, applies to a driver of a motor vehicle
who flees on foot.23° The court also upheld the defendant's convic-
tion of driving under the influence. 231 The conviction was sup-
ported by sufficient evidence, and therefore, the results of an
intoxilyzer test were not necessary. Lastly, the court held that the
222. Id. The supreme court found sufficient evidence in the trial court's record to
support the spousal support award. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 719. See Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651, 658 (N.D. 1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-05-23 (1991). This statute allows the court to award temporary support during
the appeal of a divorce judgment.
225. Ness, 467 N.W.2d at 719.
226. Id. Justice Gierke dissented only to the court's holding that affirmed the award of
25% of the husband's mineral income to the wife. Id. (Gierke, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Gierke concluded that the record did not disclose any reasonable
explanation in support of the award, and thus it was clearly erroneous. Id. at 720.
227. 462 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1990).
228. State v. Pollack, 462 N.w.2d 119, 120 (N.D. 1990).
229. ld. at 121. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-71 (1987).
230. Pollack, 462 N.W.2d at 121.
231. Id. at 122.
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defendant's claim of ineffective counsel would not be heard on
direct appeal.232
In the early morning hours of August 2, 1989, Helen Schaible,
a police officer in Mott, stopped the vehicle driven by Richard E.
Pollack.23 3 Mr. Pollack was stopped because the officer had
observed him speeding, making a wide turn onto Main Street and
continuing down the middle of the street before returning to the
proper lane of traffic.234 The officer pulled Mr. Pollack over and
then approached his vehicle.235 The officer then asked Mr. Pollack
for his driver's license, upon which Mr. Pollack stated that he did
not have a driver's license and that the officer was aware of that
fact.236 While talking to Mr. Pollack, Officer Schaible detected the
odor of alcohol and had also noticed that Pollack was slurring his
words.237 Officer Schaible asked Mr. Pollack to get out of his vehi-
cle and into the police car.238 While she was escorting him to her
car he ran away.239
The trial court found Pollack guilty of three offenses: (1) driv-
ing under the influence, (2) driving without a license, and (3) flee-
ing or attempting to elude a police officer.240 Pollack appealed all
three convictions and also contended that he received ineffective
counsel at trial.241
Pollack argued that section 39-10-71 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code pertains to fleeing in a motor vehicle.242 The state
countered that the statute was to be interpreted broadly to
include a driver fleeing on foot.243 The supreme court agreed
with the state's argument citing the January 15, 1987 Minutes of
the House Transportation Committee regarding this statute. The
phrase "in any manner" was added to the original statute "to
broaden the law to include a driver who flees on foot as well as in
his vehicle. 2 44
The court declined to address Pollack's contention that he
received ineffective counsel at trial.2 45 There was no stipulation
232. Id.
233. Id. at 120.
234. Id.
235. Pollack, 462 N.W.2d at 120.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. ld. at 120-22.
242. Id. at 120.
243. Pollack, 462 N.W.2d at 121.
244. Id. at 120.
245. Id. at 122.
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by the parties and the record did not adequately reflect that Pol-
lack's counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The court stated
that Mr. Pollack may raise such a claim at a post-conviction hear-
ing, but not on direct appeal.246 The judgments of the conviction
were affirmed.247
Glaspey v. Backes
In Glaspey v. Backes, 248 Terry Glaspey appealed from a dis-
trict court judgment which upheld an administrative suspension of
his driver's license. 249 The suspension was based on a finding that
Glaspey was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors. 0
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
Glaspey was arrested and charged with driving under the
influence. He requested and was granted an administrative hear-
ing in order to contest the suspension of his license.2 5 ' The charge
of driving under the influence had been brought based on the
results of a blood test which showed Glaspey's blood alcohol con-
tent to be .15% at the time of his arrest.252 On appeal, Glaspey
contended that the blood test should not have been admitted and
that the judgment upholding the administrative suspension should
be reversed. 5 3
Glaspey asserted that the state failed to show that a non-alco-
holic, non-volatile skin disinfectant was used prior to his blood
drawing.25 4 The state toxicologist has set out a nine-step proce-
dure for collecting and submitting blood samples which must be
followed for the results to be admissible in court.2 5 Part of the
nine-step procedure requires the use of "non-alcoholic, non-vola-
tile skin disinfectant. ' 256 The medical lab technician who col-
lected Glaspey's blood sample testified that she did not know
whether or not the skin disinfectant she had used on Mr. Glaspey
was non-alcoholic.25 7 The supreme court held that "absent any
contrary evidence" they could not be assured that a non-alcohol,
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 462 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1990).
249. Glaspey v. Backes, 462 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1990).
250. Id. at 636.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Glaspey, 462 N.W.2d at 636.
255. Schwind v. Department of Transp., 462 N.W.2d 147, 151 (N.D. 1990).
256. Claspey, 462 N.W.2d at 636.
257. Id. at 637.
1992] 779
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
non-volatile skin disinfectant had been used. 8 The court recog-
nized that if an alcoholic disinfectant had been used, then the
accuracy and reliability of the blood test results would be signifi-
cantly diminished.259
The supreme court found that the suspension of Mr. Glaspey's
license was based solely on the finding that he was driving under
the influence. This finding was derived from the unreliable blood
test results. Therefore, the court held that his license suspension
must be reversed.26 °
Throlson v. Backes
In Throlson v. Backes,261 the Director of the North Dakota
Department of Transportation appealed the judgment of the dis-
trict court.2 62 The district court's decision reversed the Depart-
ment's suspension of Mr. Throlson's driver's license.26 3 The
supreme court affirmed the district court's decision.2
On December 2, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Dingeman stopped to
assist a vehicle which was parked by the side of the road. 65 Mr.
Throlson was in control of the car.2 6 The deputy observed that
Throlson appeared to have been using alcohol.267 The deputy
asked to see Mr. Throlson's driver's license. 68 It was then discov-
ered that Mr. Throlson's license was under suspension.269 Mr.
Throlson was arrested for driving with a suspended license.2
Subsequent to his arrest, Throlson was asked to take a field sobri-
ety test and a blood alcohol test.2  Throlson refused. 2  At an
administrative hearing which followed, Throlson's license was sus-
pended for two years based on his refusal to submit to a blood alco-
hol test.2 7 3 This refusal violated section 39-20-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.).2 7 4 Throlson appealed and the
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 466 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1991).
262. Throlson v. Backes, 466 N.W.2d 124, 125 (N.D. 1991).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Throlson, 466 N.W.2d at 125.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Throlson, 466 N.W.2d at 125.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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district court reversed the suspension.27 5 The district court found
that Mr. Throlson was required, under section 39-20-01, to be
informed that he was under arrest for a DUI, before he could be
legally requested to submit to blood testing. 7  Mr. Throlson was
not informed he was being arrested for a DUI, and therefore, the
officer's request and Throlson's refusal were not legally
effective. 7
The supreme court agreed with the district court's interpreta-
tion of section 39-20-01 of the N.DC.C. 2 7 8 The court held that
chemical testing to determine a driver's blood alcohol content
must only be done after the driver has been placed under arrest
and informed that he will be charged with driving under the influ-
ence.2 7 9 The court found no evidence in the record that Throlson
was advised that he was being charged with DUI, therefore, Throl-
son's failure to submit to a blood alcohol test was not a "refusal"
under Chapter 39-20. ' o
Davis v. Backes
In Davis v. Backes,28' the supreme court upheld the district
court's reinstatement of Davis' driving privileges. The court found
that Davis' due process right to have an extradition proceeding
was violated and the request that Davis submit to a second Intox-
ilyzer test was unreasonable.282
Davis, a Native American and member of the Turtle Moun-
tain Board of Chippewa, was stopped by North Dakota Highway
Patrol Officer Mitchell Rumple near mile marker 246 on U.S. high-
way 281.283 Davis was arrested for driving under the influence. 8 4
Officer Rumple believed his arrest was made on reservation land,
and consequently, he attempted to follow customary procedures
for an arrest by State Patrol officers on reservation land.285 Rum-
ple called the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officers for assist-
ance. 28" The BIA officers arrived and transported Davis to the
275. Id.
276. Id. at 126.
277. Throlson, 466 N.W.2d at 127.
278. Id. at 126-27.
279. Id. at 127.
280. Id. at 128 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-20).
281. 467 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1991).
282. Davis v. Backes, 467 N.W.2d 420, 420 (N.D. 1991).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 420-21.
286. Davis, 467 N.W.2d at 421.
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Belcourt BIA police station.28 t Davis first refused to take an Intox-
ilyzer test, but later consented and was transported to Rolla, North
Dakota, the location of the nearest working Intoxylizer. 8 8
It was later discovered that Davis' arrest had taken place
outside of the reservation boundaries." ° Rumple also discovered
that the Intoxylizer test given to Davis in Rolla did not meet the
guidelines of the state toxicologist and thus, results from the test
would not be admissible in a state court.2 9°  Rumple then
requested that Davis submit to a second test in which state guide-
lines would be followed.2 9 1 Davis refused and the director of the
North Dakota Department of Transportation revoked Davis'
license based on the refusal.2 92 At the administrative hearing that
followed, the revocation of Davis' driving privileges was upheld
because Davis had violated the implied consent statute by his
refusal to submit to a second Intoxilyzer test. 9 3
The district court reinstated Davis' drivers license, finding
Davis' due process rights were violated and that the request that
Davis take a second Intoxylizer test was unreasonable. 94 The
Director appealed, arguing simply that Davis had been arrested
based on a reasonable belief that he was driving while drunk and
that Davis had refused to take a blood-alcohol test.29 5
The supreme court disagreed with the director and found no
refusal by Davis. 9 6 Davis' consent to take the test, negated his
earlier refusal.29 7 Furthermore, the court found that Officer Rum-
ple was not authorized to request or to direct a second chemical
test of Davis on the reservation and that Rumple had no jurisdic-
tional authority to request that Davis submit to a blood test off of
the reservation.29 8 Therefore, Davis' license was reinstated.
Chief Justice Erickstad dissented.9 9 In Justice Erickstad's
opinion, Mr. Davis' license was rightfully suspended because of his
refusal to submit to blood testing when first asked by Officer Rum-
ple on the highway. Erickstad argued that the rule established in
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Davis, 467 N.W.2d at 421.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 422.
296. Davis, 467 N.W.2d at 422.
297. Id. at 423.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 424 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting).
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Lund v. Helle,3 ° ° which allows a subsequent agreement to take a
blood test to negate the effect of the initial refusal, should not be
extended to Davis' case.30 ' Justice Erickstad stated that the exten-
sion should not be allowed because the state officers in the Davis
case were forced to surrender custody to the BIA officers. 302
Davis' consent to the blood test was given to the BIA officers, it
was never given to Officer Rumple and therefore, the consent did
not negate his subsequent refusal to take the Intoxilyzer test
offered by Officer Rumple. 30 3
State v. Zummach
In State v. Zummach, °4 the supreme court reversed the trial
court's decision and remanded the case for rehearing. 305 Susan
Kay Zummach was arrested for DUI on January 16, 1990.306 Prior
to her arrest and prior to receiving her Miranda warnings, Zum-
mach was given a field sobriety test in which she was required to
recite the alphabet.3 7 Zummach failed the test. The trial court
considered this failure in its conviction of Zummach of driving
under the influence.30 8
On appeal, Zummach opposed the entry into evidence of tes-
timony that she failed the field test.309 Zummach claimed that the
evidence of her failure to correctly recite the alphabet should not
be admitted because she was not given her Miranda warnings
prior to the testing.310 The supreme court, in City of Wahpeton v.
Skoog,31' held that the field tests "do not force the subject to
betray his subjective knowledge through his communicative facili-
ties," and therefore, Miranda warnings need not be given prior to
the testing.31 2 The supreme court concluded that Zummach's reci-
tation of the alphabet was not testimonial, and therefore, Miranda
warnings were not required.31 3
300. 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974).
301. Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974).
302. Davis, 467 N.W.2d at 424.
303. Id. at 425.
304. 467 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1991).
305. State v. Zummach, 467 N.W.2d 745, 747 (N.D. 1991).
306. Id. at 746.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Zummach, 467 N.W.2d at 746.
311. 300 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1980).
312. City of Wahpeton v. Skoog, 300 N.W.2d 243, 245 (N.D. 1980).
313. Zummach, 467 N.W.2d at 746. Recitation of the alphabet does not involve
revealing any subjective knowledge that could be incriminating and therefore, it is not
protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id.
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On appeal, however, Zunmnach also argued that the jury
instructions that were given "created an impermissible conclusive
presumption that the test was fairly administered merely because
it was received in evidence."'314 The supreme court agreed, stat-
ing that the instructions given erroneously impaired the jury's
function of weighing the evidence and finding whether the test
was fairly administered.31 5 Thus, the court concluded that a new
trial with proper instructions was required.31 6
Fetzer v. Director, Department of Transportation
In Fetzer v. Director, Department of Transportation,17 the
issue was whether pleading guilty to criminal charges of physical
control under section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
(N.D.C.C.), resulting in a suspension of a driver's license, precludes
an administrative revocation of a driver's license for refusing a
blood test.3 18
In June of 1990, Michael J. Fetzer was found by police officers
sleeping in his pickup, which was parked off the street, but within
the city limits on private property that was under construction.31 9
Fetzer was awakened by the officers and placed under arrest after
he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. 32 0 Fetzer
refused to take a blood alcohol test.321 After the North Dakota
Department of Transportation (Department) notified Fetzer that,
pursuant to section 39-20-04 of the N.D.C.C., the Department
intended to revoke his license for refusing to submit to testing, an
administrative hearing was held.322 Fetzer's license was revoked
for 2 years. Fetzer appealed this administrative decision to the
district court.32 3 The district court reversed, on the basis that
Fetzer was on private property which the public did not have a
right to enter. 24 Therefore, the district court concluded section
39-08-01 of the N.D.C.C. was inapplicable. 325 The Department
appealed contending section 39-08-01 applied to private prop-
314. Id. at 746-47.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 474 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1991).
318. Fetzer v. Director, Dep't of Transp., 474 N.W.2d 71, 72 (N.D. 1991).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Fetzer, 474 N.W.2d at 72.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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erty.3 26 However, criminal charges had been brought against
Fetzer, pursuant to section 38-08-01, to which Fetzer plead guilty,
resulting in the suspension of his license.32 7 Fetzer contended that
his criminal conviction rendered the Department's appeal
moot.
328
The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed noting that
section 39-06.1-10 of the N.D.C.C. made it "clear" that criminal
convictions, resulting in license suspension, were not meant to
prevent the "primary administrative remedy" of license revoca-
tion for refusing to submit to a blood test. 32 9 The court also noted
that section 39-20-04 provided a procedure to prevent the admin-
istrative revocation of a license for refusing to submit to a test
upon the pleading of guilty to criminal charges. 330 The court con-
cluded that because Fetzer did not follow this procedure, the
appeal was not moot.33
1
As to the Department's contention that section 39-08-01 of
the N.D.C.C. applied to private property, the court held that
recent case law supported the finding that section 39-08-01 was
applicable in this situation because the private property in ques-
tion was "accessible to the public for vehicular use."'332 Because
other people used the area openly for various activities, section 39-
08-01 applied.3 33 As a result, the supreme court reversed the dis-
trict courts decision.334
Ehrlich v. Backes
In Ehrlich v. Backes,335 Christi Ehrlich appealed from a dis-
trict court's judgment which affirmed the administrative suspen-
sion of her driving privileges.336 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's decision holding that Ehrlich's
rights had been sufficiently protected.337
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Fetzer, 474 N.w.2d at 72.
329. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (the time of criminal
revocations of licenses accrue when determining the time of administrative revocation
orders).
330. Fetzer, 474 N.W.2d at 72.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 73.
333. Id.
334. Id. In concurrence, Justice Levine believed that § 39-08-01 of the N.D.C.C. did
not apply to "'private property not accessible to the public," but, she indifferently joined the
majority. Id. (Levine, J., concurring in the result).
335. 477 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1991).
336. Ehrlich v. Backes, 477 N.W.2d 211, 212 (N.D. 1991).
337. Id. at 214.
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Ehrlich was stopped by Officer Lykken.3 3 8 Ehrlich was given
several field sobriety tests which she failed. 3 9 After failing the
tests, Ehrlich was given her Miranda warnings and was asked to
submit to a chemical test of her blood. 40 She refused to take the
test unless an attorney was present.3 4 ' Lykken read the implied
consent law, which allows for suspension of a drivers license for
failure to submit to a chemical test, to Ehrlich.3 42 Lykken then
gave Ehrlich an opportunity to call an attorney, which she did not
do.3
43
At the administrative hearing which followed, Lykken testi-
fied that he had lawfully arrested Ehrlich and that he had given
her an opportunity to call an attorney. 44 Lykken also testified
that he had been present when another officer explained to Ehr-
lich that the right to counsel did not apply to the taking of a chem-
ical test.345 The hearing officer then revoked Ehrlich's license for
one year. Ehrlich appealed and the district court affirmed the
revocation.346
On appeal to the supreme court, Ehrlich argued that her fail-
ure to submit to the chemical test was not a refusal because of her
confusion in regard to her right to counsel.347 The court cited to
Agnew v. Hjelle,348 in which the court discussed the "confusion
doctrine," which provides that a defendant's failure to take a
chemical test because of confusion over the application of the
Miranda rules does not constitute "refusal to submit. ' 349 How-
ever, the court in Agnew also stated that this rule does not apply
when the arresting officer explains the non-application of the
Miranda rights.35 ° In the case at hand, the court, in reviewing the
record, found that Ehrlich had been informed as to the non-appli-
cation of the Miranda warnings as they apply to chemical testing
situations.35'
On appeal, Ehrlich also argued that officer Lykken's testimony
as to the information given to Ehrlich by another officer about the
338. Id. at 212.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Ehrlich, 477 N.W.2d at 212.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 213.
346. Ehrlich, 477 N.W.2d at 212.
347. Id.
348. 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1974).
349. Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1974).
350. Id. at 297.
351. Ehrlich, 477 N.W.2d at 213.
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non-application of her Miranda rights in regard to chemical test-
ing of her blood, should have been inadmissible as hearsay.35 2 The
court found that this argument failed. Officer Lykken's testimony
was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but
rather to show that she could not have refused the blood test
because she was confused.35 3 Therefore, the statements were
admissible under the hearsay exception, Rule 801(c) of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence.354
Lastly, the court noted that Ehrlich was given an opportunity
to call an attorney to assist her. According to the court, a reason-
able opportunity was all she was entitled.355
EVIDENCE
Wanner v. Getter Trucking Inc.
The Getter Trucking Inc., in Wanner v. Getter Trucking
Inc.,356 appealed from a judgment entered on a jury verdict that
awarded $700,000 to the plaintiff, Rick Wanner.357 Getter raised
several issues on appeal. 35 8 Getter's main contention was that "the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing William Bateman to
testify as an expert witness." 359
Wanner, a floorhand for Dual Drilling, was injured in a fall
from an oil derrick that was in the process of being prepared for a
move to another drilling site.36 ° Since the move was a short one,
the derrick was left intact and simply placed in a horizontal posi-
tion.361 A Getter Trucking Inc. employee, operating a Getter
crane, hoisted a travel block assembly inside the derrick to keep it
in place.362 Wanner and another Dual Drilling employee standing
atop the derrick, assisted in securing the block to the derrick.363
The hook portion of Getter's crane shifted down during this pro-
cess, causing the derrick to vibrate.3 64 Wanner lost his balance as a
result of the vibration and fell thirty feet, landing headfirst.36 5
352. Id.
353. Id. at 214.
354. N.D. R. EVID. 801(c).
355. Ehrlich, 477 N.W.2d at 214.
356. 466 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1991).
357. Wanner v. Getter Trucking, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 833, 835 (N.D. 1991).
358. Id. at 835.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Wanner, 466 N.W.2d at 835.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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The contention, on appeal, was that Mr. Bateman was not
qualified to testify as an expert as governed by Rule 702 of the
North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 366 Rule 702 sets out a two-part
test to determine the admissibility of testimony of an expert.367
The person must first qualify as an expert, and second, the testi-
mony given must be shown to assist the trier of fact. 68
The trial court had received evidence that Mr. Bateman had a
Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering and had
worked as an engineer for many years, including twenty-five years
for Shell Oil.3 69 Also, the trial court found that Bateman's testi-
mony assisted the trier of fact, particularly his testimony that Get-
ter could have used safer methods of hoisting the block than they
actually used.370 The supreme court agreed with the trial court's
findings.37 1 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that
the trial court had not "abused its discretion by allowing Bateman
to provide expert testimony. "372
Getter also asserted that the jury had erred in not finding that
Wanner was contributorily negligent in walking atop the der-
rick.373 The supreme court found that the jury did not err by refus-
ing to find Mr. Wanner negligent and instead found that his
behavior set the standard of reasonable care required.3
Getter also asserted that the jury's award was erroneous
because they were influenced by passion and prejudice, however,
he showed no evidence, at trial or on appeal, that the jury had
been influenced in this way. 5
Lastly, Getter objected to the jury instructions given.376 The
trial court found that the jury instructions were adequate and the
supreme court agreed. 7 7 The award was sustained.378
Justice Levine concurred with the court's decision spe-
cially.37 9 Justice Levine stated that normally "[d]oubts about the
usefulness of expert testimony ... should be resolved in favor of
366. N.D. R. Evil. 702.
367. Wanner, 466 N.W.2d at 835.
368. Id. (citing Patch v. Sebelius, 346 N.W.2d 637, 643 (N.D. 1984)).
369. Id. at 836-37.
370. Id. at 837.
371. Id.
372. Wanner, 466 N.W.2d at 837.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 838. The court had refused to give an instruction to the jury on
..unavoidable accident." Id.
377. Wanner, 466 N.W.2d at 838.
378. Id.
379. Id. (Levine, J., concurring specially).
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admissibility.""'
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
State v. Plentychief
The issue in State v. Plentychief,38 1 was whether Plentychief's
jury conviction for attempted felonious restraint under terrorizing
circumstances was proper when considering the jury instructions
given and the amount of evidence offered.38 2 Plentychief and
some friends left a bar and entered a bus depot to call a cab.
3 3
While in the depot, Plentychief went into the restroom where she
encountered a four-year-old girl.384 The testimony of a witness
revealed that: (1) Plentychief grabbed the girl by the hand; and (2)
Plentychief said both, "'Come on, let's go'" and "'Well, I'm your
Mommy now.' ",385 The depot security was informed of the inci-
dent and held Plentychief until the police came to arrest her for
"attempted abduction or [alternatively] an attempted felonious
restraint under terrorizing circumstances. ' 38 6 Before the jury
deliberated, the court read a "lengthy" jury instruction to them
defining "terrorizing circumstances." '387  The jury found
Plentychief guilty of felonious restraint under terrorizing circum-
stances and Plentychief appealed.388
The North Dakota Supreme Court believed that the jury
instruction defining "terrorizing circumstances" was nebulous and
"misled" the jury, not allowing them to make a proper decision.38 9
Further, the court held that the jury could not have reasonably
concluded that Plentychief's conduct constituted the "essential
elements of threats of violence or acts dangerous to human life
made with an intent to induce fear" of the felony.390 The court
reversed the conviction, but remanded the case for a new trial on
the "undecided misdemeanor charges of unlawful imprisonment
or attempted unlawful imprisonment. 391
In his dissent, Justice Vande Walle believed that the jury
instruction was adequate and that there was sufficient evidence
380. Id.
381. 464 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1990).
382. State v. Plentychief, 464 N.w.2d 373, 374 (N.D. 1990).
383. Id. at 373.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 374.
387. Plentychief, 464 N.W.2d at 375.
388. Id. at 374.
389. Id. at 375.
390. Id. at 375-76.
391. Id. at 376 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
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offered to sustain the jury's verdict.392 Vande Walle believed that
the jury instruction, which allowed the age of the victim to be con-
sidered, was proper because the actor's intent to place another
human being in fear is "directly related" to the age of the
victim. 393
FAMILY LAW
Younger v. Bryant
The supreme court, in State ex. rel. Younger v. Bryant,
394
affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part, the findings
of the district court.395 The trial court ordered Mr. Weldon Bry-
ant, Jr. to pay an increased monthly child support amount based
on a five percent increase in Bryant's income and on the recent
enactment of the North Dakota child support guidelines.396
On January 3, 1990, Dawn Younger, the mother and custodial
parent of Charia Young, moved the court to amend a child support
judgment entered on March 24, 1986, in order to secure an
increase in Mr. Bryant's child support obligation.397 To warrant an
increase in child support, a material change in circumstance for
either party must have occurred since the entry of the original
judgment.398 This change is usually indicated by some financial
change in circumstances.3 99 The supreme court found that the
five percent increase in Mr. Bryant's income was a change in cir-
cumstance which would warrant an increase in his child support
obligation, but that the enactment of the new child support guide-
lines was not a change in circumstances. 40 0 Based on the five per-
cent increase in Mr. Bryant's income, the court held that it was not
left with the "firm conviction" that the trial court was in err in
increasing his child support obligation.40 '
The court was forced, nonetheless, to reverse and remand the
judgment of the lower court because the lower court applied the
guidelines as mandatory.40 2 The guidelines are merely to be used
with discretion by the trial court. There was no showing "that the
392. Plentychief, 464 N.W.2d at 377 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 376.
394. 465 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1991).
395. State ex. rel. Younger v. Bryant, 465 N.W.2d 155, 156 (N.D. 1991).
396. Id. at 156-57.
397. Id. at 156.
398. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 432 N.W.2d 860, 862 (N.D. 1988).
399. Id. See also Skoglund v. Skoglund, 333 N.W.2d 795, 796 (N.D. 1983).
400. Bryant, 465 N.W.2d at 159. The guideline enactment was not a change in Mr.
Bryant's financial circumstances, it was a change in a state statute. Id.
401. Id. at 160.
402. Id.
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trial court exercised its discretion in setting the amount of child
support rather than relying exclusively on the [North Dakota child
support guidelines].- 40 3
Therefore, the supreme court reversed and remanded the
case to the district court to allow that court to make its determina-
tion based on the application of the child support guidelines as dis-
cretionary. However, the court did affirm the lower courts
decision to deny a modification of the allocation of the child
dependency exemptions, to deny an order for Bryant to pay
Charia's health insurance premiums and to deny payment of Ms.
Younger's attorney's fees by Mr. Bryant.40 4
INSURANCE
Thompson v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co.
The issue raised in Thompson v. Nodak Mutual Insurance
Co.,405 was whether the trial court's grant of summary judgment
to the insurer, denying the insured underinsured motorist benefits
under an insurance contract purchased from the insurer, was
proper.40 6 In this case, the insured was killed in an auto-accident
and the insured's family received the $500,000 limit from the
third-party tort-feasor's insurance company.40 7  Because the
insured's family believed damages exceeded $500,000, they sought
to recover the rest under the insured's underinsured motorist pro-
vision by filing this suit.408 The district court granted a summary
judgment for the insurer.40 9
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the insurance
contract's provision, pertaining to underinsured motor vehicle
coverage, was unambiguous. 410 The court concluded that the lan-
guage used in the policy permitted underinsurance benefits to be
paid only when the amount of insurance carried by the tort-feasor
is less than the applicable limit of underinsurance coverage.4 ' In
this case, the tort-feasor's coverage exceeded the insured's under-
insured coverage. 4 2 Therefore, when interpreting the contract as
a whole, the court held that the underinsurance provision was
403. Id. at 161 (Levine, J., concurring specially).
404. Id.
405. 466 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1991).
406. Thompson v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 466 N.W.2d 115, 115 (N.D. 1991).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 116.
409. Id. at 115.
410. Id. at 117.
411. Thompson, 466 N.W.2d at 117.
412. ld.
1992] 791
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
unambiguous.4 13 The court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the insurer.414
In dissent, Justice Meschke maintained that when an ambigu-
ity arises in the interpretation as to the extent of the coverage,
which can reasonably impose liability on either the insurer or the
insured, the ambiguity should be construed to the insurer's
detriment.1 5
MENTAL HEALTH
In re M.H.
The issue in In re M.H.,416 was whether the supreme court
should fully review the trial court's determination that clear and
convincing evidence existed to support the civil commitment of
the plaintiff.417 The county court was requested to involuntarily
commit M.H., the plaintiff, to receive treatment at St. Alexius
Medical Center.41  After a preliminary hearing, the county court
ordered M.H. to be treated at St. Alexius Medical Center, but the
treatment was limited to 14 days.4 19 Subsequently, a treatment
hearing was held to determine if M.H. was in need of more treat-
ment.420 At the treatment hearing, there was evidence that
M.H.'s mental and physical health would most likely deteriorate if
M.H. did not receive treatment in a hospital. 42 1 The testimony of
a psychiatrist, who had seen M.H. intermittently for 4-5 years, was
that M.H. had schizo affective schizophrenia and was "possibly"
dangerous to herself if not committed.422 Further, the judge
noted that M.H. had an involuntary commitment proceeding dis-
missed against her earlier and that despite the dismissal, she was
readmitted to the hospital for treatment that was similar to the
413. Id.
414. Id. at 119.
415. Id. at 120 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
416. 475 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1991).
417. In re M.H., 475 N.W.2d 552,553 (N.D. 1991). M.H.'s son was the person seeking to
involuntarily commit his mother. Id.
418. Id.
419. ld.
420. Id. Section 25-03.1-02(10)d of the North Dakota Century Code, which defines a
person requiring treatment, provides in pertinent part:
10. 'Person requiring treatment' means a person who is mentally ill ... and
there is a reasonable expectation that if the person is not treated there exists a
serious risk of harm to that person .... "Serious risk of harm' means a substantial
likelihood of:
d. Substantial deterioration in mental health which would predictably result
in dangerousness to that person ....
N.D. CENT. CODE. § 25-03.1-02(10)d (1989 & Supp. 1991).
421. In re MH., 475 N.W.2d at 553.
422. Id. at 555 nn. 3,4.
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treatment sought in the current proceeding.4 23 Based on the evi-
dence, the trial court found that M.H. was "a person requiring
treatment. 42 4 M.H. contended on appeal that a determination of
civil commitment was a conclusion of law and should have been
"fully reviewable" by the supreme court.4z
The supreme court noted that upon review of trial court deci-
sions to involuntarily commit individuals, the review is "limited to
a review of the procedures, findings, and conclusions of the lower
court. ' 426 Also, the supreme court noted that the case law in
North Dakota supported the view that when a trial court finds
clear and convincing evidence to involuntarily commit an individ-
ual, the supreme court should treat this as a finding of fact, to be
set aside only if the finding is clearly erroneous. 427 Although the
supreme court suggested that the psychiatrist should have used
the term probable instead of possible when explaining whether
M.H. posed a serious risk of harm to herself, the supreme court
held that the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.4 ' As
a result, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that
there was clear and convincing evidence that M.H. be involunta-
rily committed.429
In his dissent, Justice Vande Walle viewed section 25-03.1-
02(1OXd) of the North Dakota Century Code as not having been
met.430 His reasoning was based on the psychiatrist using the
word "possibly." 43
1
MINES AND MINERALS
Knife River Coal Mining Co. v. Neuberger
In Knife River Coal Mining Co. v. Neuberger,43 2 the Supreme
Court of North Dakota held that when the surface owners con-
sented to coal mining by entering into leases with a mineral devel-
oper, the mineral developer would not be liable for damages to
subsequent surface owners under the Surface Owner Protection
Act, because the leases ran with the land.433
423. Id. at 555.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 553-54.
426. In re M.H., 475 N.W.2d at 553.
427. Id. at 554. See In re Gust, 392 N.W.2d 824, 826 (N.D. 1986) (showing that the
clearly erroneous standard is the standard of review in commitment cases).
428. In re MH., 475 N.W.2d at 557.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 558 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
431. Id.
432. 466 N.W.2d 606 (N.D. 1991).
433. Knife River Coal Mining Co. v. Neuberger, 466 N.W.2d 606, 607 (N.D. 1991).
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Adam and Ella Neuberger owned the entire surface interest
of a section of land and 100% of the coal interest in the section's
south half and 50% of the coal interest in the section's north
half.43 4 In 1959, they leased the section to the Knife River Coal
Mining Company (Knife River) for mining coal.4 35 When both of
the Neubergers died, the defendants in this case assumed the own-
ership interests. 436 When Knife River filed an action to settle the
allocation of payments that were due under the two coal leases,
the defendants filed counterclaims alleging that Knife River owed
them money under the Surface Owner Protection Act (Act).437
The district court issued an order on September 20, 1989, that
denied the defendants' motion to strike Knife River's assertion
that the Act had a six-year statute of limitations.438 On November
9, 1989, the district court found no liability under the Act and dis-
missed the defendants' claims, but reserved entering the judg-
ment until the allocation of payments was settled.4 39
Subsequently, the defendants came to an agreement with Knife
River on the allocation of payments, the district court entered the
judgment and the defendants appealed the holding that Knife
River was not liable under the Act.44°
The supreme court stated that the Act's primary purpose was
to give maximum protection to surface owners who had not con-
sented to the "undesirable effects of development."' 441 In this
case, however, the court concluded that section 38-18-06(3) of the
North Dakota Century Code considered any previously executed
mineral lease or surface lease executed by the surface owner to
constitute consent that is binding on subsequent owners.4 42 As a
result, the court held that the leases ran with the land and there-
fore prevented the defendants from recovering under the Act.443
Judgment was affirmed.444
434. Id. at 608.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 607.
438. Neuberger, 466 N.W.2d at 607.
439. Id. at 607-08.
440. Id. at 608.
441. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-03 and demonstrating the intent of the Act).
442. Id. at 609.
443. Neuberger, 466 N.W.2d at 609.
444. Id. at 610.
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MORTGAGES
First Interstate Bank of Fargo v. Larson
In First Interstate Bank of Fargo v. Larson,445 Gate City Sav-
ings & Loan Association loaned H & H Investment Company
$260,000 to construct two apartment buildings.4 6 The loan was
secured by mortgages of $130,000 apiece for the two buildings.447
The buildings were later conveyed to the partnership of Village
Apartments with the mortgages.44 8
Approximately seven years later, Village Apartments took out
a $175,000 loan with First Interstate Bank of Fargo.449 This loan
was secured by a second mortgage on the two apartment build-
ings.450 The loan was renewed and the mortgage was extended
several times.45 ' The loan renewal documents included various
promissory notes and "continuing, unconditional guaranties of
payment of the partnership's debt by the partners. 452
Village Apartments defaulted on its loans with both Gate City
and First Interstate.453 Gate City foreclosed on the original mort-
gage, and at the foreclosure sale, bought the apartment buildings
for the amount of the partnership debt.454 First Interstate sought
to collect on the loan through a suit based on the partners' per-
sonal guarantees.455 The partners answered the complaint and, in
a motion to amend their original answer, the partners asserted
that the anti-deficiency statutes prevented enforcement of guaran-
tees prior to foreclosure on a mortgage.456 First Interstate then
purchased the buildings from Gate City for $221,053.63 and resold
them for $197,044.54. 4, 7  As a result, First Interstate moved to
amend its complaint in order to request recovery of the difference
between the price paid for the apartments and the price received
on the sale.458 Village Apartments counter claimed, requesting
dismissal of Interstate's suit based on Interstate's recovery. 459 The
trial court denied the motions and ordered that the partners pay
445. 475 N.W.2d 538 (N.D. 1991).
446. First Interstate Bank of Fargo v. Larson, 475 N.W.2d 538, 540 (N.D. 1991).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Larson, 475 N.W.2d at 540.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Larson, 475 N.W.2d at 540.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
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$162,741.42 as the balance due on their personal guarantees. 4r °
The partnership argued that Mandan Security Bank v. Hein-
sohn should be overruled.4 61 In Heinsohn, the court held that a
distinction existed between liability of partners in a mortgage debt
and an actual personal guarantee situation which prevented the
anti-deficiency statutes from being applied to personal guaran-
tees.462 The partners asserted that because their liability did not
change since they were both principle debtors to guarantors, the
anti-deficiency statutes should apply.463 The North Dakota
Supreme Court agreed with this contention and overruled Hein-
sohn.464 The court found that the distinctions in liability relied on
in Heinsohn to be illusory and, therefore, held that "a partner's
guarantee of a partnership debt is not a separate obligation. ' 465
Therefore, the court found the anti-deficiency statutes to be
applicable.466
The court found, however, that its decision must be applied
prospectively.467 This determination was based of a number of
relevant guidelines. 46  The court specifically found that the rule
should be applied prospectively because on the clean establish-
ment of a new principle of law which would effect the previously
established contractual relationship between First Interstate and
the Village Apartments. 46 9 Allowing retroactive application of this
decision "would violate the parties contractual obligations and
expectations .... "470 Accordingly, the supreme court held that
the trial court did not err in denying the partners motion to
amend their answer to include the anti-deficiency statute claim.471
First Interstate asserted a claim that the trial court erred in
not allowing the amendment of their complaint to recover the
$23,109.09 it lost.472  The partnership again counterclaimed,
asserting their belief that Interstate's recovery of the property
from Gate City should have resulted in a dismissal of their
460. Id.
461. Larson, 475 N.W.2d at 540-41 (citing Mandan Sec. Bank v. Heinsohn, 320 N.W.2d
494 (N.D. 1982)).
462. Heinsohn, 320 N.W.2d at 498.
463. Larson, 475 N.W.2d at 543.
464. Id. (citing Hagan v. Havnvik, 421 N.W.2d 56 (N.D. 1988); First Bank of Williston
v. Ashton, 426 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1989)).
465. Id. at 544.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Larson, 475 N.W.2d at 545.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 546.
472. Id. at 540.
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claim.47 3 The supreme court upheld the trial court's decision on
both matters. First Interstate took the property with the mort-
gage interest which Gate City held.474 Village Apartments had
made no personal guarantee with Gate City. Therefore, allowing
payment of the deficiency between the sale price to the purchase
price would violate the Short-Term Mortgage Redemption Act
which reads: "a mortgagee or any party claiming by, through or
undersaid mortgagee shall not be entitled to any judgment for
deficiency." 47 5
Surrogate Justice Pedersen dissented, asserting that although
Heinsohn does need some changes, completely overruling of it
"could start the commercial credit system down an uncontrolled
'slippery slope.' "476
Chief Justice Erickstad also dissented, stating that Heinsohn
should not be overruled. 477 Justice Erickstad reiterated the asser-
tions made in Heinsohn that a personal guarantee changes the
nature of the obligation and the anti-deficiency statute no longer
applies.4 78
PARENT AND CHILD
lilies v. lilies
In lilies v. lilies,479 Caroline Illies appealed from a district
court order amending the parties' child support obligations.4 8 ° In
1981, the district court granted a divorce judgment for Caroline
Illies and Gerald Illies that provided an allocation of the parties
marital assets and made provisions for custody, support, and
parental visitation for the parties three children.48' In 1984, the
district court approved a stipulation that the parties had entered
into, which reduced Gerald's monthly support payments and sus-
pended Caroline's support payments, until she finished or quit col-
lege.4 82 In 1985, Gerald petitioned the court to reinstate the
original support award and to allow him to claim all of the depen-
473. Larson, 475 N.W.2d at 540.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 541. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19.1-01 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
476. Larson, 475 N.W.2d at 546 (Pederson, Surrogate J., dissenting).
477. Id. at 546 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting).
478. Id.
479. 462 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1990).
480. Illies v. lilies, 462 N.W.2d 878, 879 (N.D. 1990).
481. Id. The custody provision allowed joint custody. Id. Caroline was given primary
custody for nine-months and Gerald was required to pay $250 in child support for this nine-
month period. Id. Likewise, Caroline was required to pay $200 a month for the three
months that Gerald had custody of the children. Id.
482. Id. at 880.
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dency exemptions of the children.48 3 The court granted Gerald's
motion, but left in tact the provision that suspended Caroline's
payments.484 In 1989, Caroline graduated from college and filed a
motion to determine the amount of arrearage she owed, to elimi-
nate her support obligations, and to increase Gerald's support obli-
gations.485 Gerald made a counter motion requesting the court to
increase Caroline's support obligations.48 6 The court amended
the judgment by eliminating Caroline's support obligations, reduc-
ing her arrearage, increasing Gerald's support obligations and
allowing him to keep the dependency exemptions.4 87 Caroline
appealed, contending that Gerald's support payments should have
been higher and that she deserved all the dependency tax exemp-
tions.488 Gerald cross-appealed, maintaining the court erred by
increasing his payments, reducing the arrearage, and eliminating
Caroline's support obligations.489
On appeal, the supreme court refused to consider Caroline's
argument that the court erred by not "considering the child sup-
port guidelines in setting the amount of Gerald's support obliga-
tions" because this was a new issue raised on appeal.490 The court
noted that it does not generally consider new issues first raised on
appeal, but based on precedent, could "consider the appropriate-
ness of the court's award of child support."' 49 ' The court stated
that a significant financial change of circumstances may allow the
trial court to modify the amount of support to be paid by each
party.492 After looking at the record, the court concluded that the
child support decision by the trial court was not clearly
erroneous.
493
In addition, the court noted that trial courts are permitted to
"allocate income tax dependency exemptions," and in this case
there was no reason for the court to find the lower court's decision
to be clearly erroneous.494 The court did find, however, that the
reduction of accrued and unpaid support payments was an error
because precedent has held that an arrearage cannot be
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. lllies, 462 N.W.2d at 880.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Illies, 462 N.W.2d at 880-81.
491. Id. at 881.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. ld. at 882.
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modified.495
Lastly, the supreme court decided to clarify the applicability
of the child support guidelines mandated by section 14-09-09.7 of
the North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.), since they were
remotely involved in the case at hand and because the Temporary
Court of Appeals had reached two inconsistent results. 49 6  The
court held that the child support guidelines were invalid because
they were not promulgated in compliance with the Administrative
Agencies Practices Act at Chapter 28-32 of the N.D.C.C. 497 How-
ever, the court said that the invalidity of the guidelines did not
affect the results in the case at bar, but rather, shall be applied to
cases prospectively.498
The trial court decision was affirmed on the dependency tax
exemptions issue and on the child support obligation modifica-
tions, but was reversed and remanded on the decision to reduce
the arrearage.49 9 In addition, the court invalidated the child sup-
port guidelines. 50 0
In his dissent, Justice Meschke believed that awarding a
dependent tax exemption to Caroline would be the only fair result
since she contributed more to the care and support of the
children.5 0'
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Oanes v. Westgo Inc.
In Oanes v. Westgo, Inc.,502 Dale Oanes' employer, Westway,
bought a portable auger from Rust, the seller. 0 3 The auger had a
"1 1/4 inch extension protruding from the drive shaft" of the auger
to accommodate an attachment, which was designed by the manu-
facturer for the auger.50 4 Nevertheless, some Westway employees
constructed their own device to attach to the 1 1/4 inch protruding
extension, which required the drilling of a hole in the auger to
prevent the attachment from coming off.505 While at work, Dale's
495. lllies, 462 N.W.2d at 882.
496. Id. at 882-83.
497. Id. at 883.
498. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Vande Walle was "uncomfortable" with the
approach the court chose to resolve the guideline inconsistency, but thought it was
appropriate to rectify future problems. Id. at 884 (Vande Walle, J., concurring specially).
499. lllies, 462 N.W.2d at 884.
500. Id. at 883.
501. Id. at 884. (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting).
502. 476 N.W.2d 248 (N.D. 1991).
503. Oanes v. Westgo, Inc., 476 N.W.2d 248, 250 (N.D. 1991).
504. Id.
505. Id.
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right leg came in contact with the employee's attachment, causing
an injury that subsequently resulted in the amputation of Dale's
leg."° As a result, Dale and Cathrine Oanes brought a products
liability action against the manufacturer, distributor, and the
retailer of the auger.5 0 7 The Oaneses' suit, which was based on
negligent design, negligent failure to warn, and strict liability fail-
ure to warn, resulted in the judge granting a directed verdict for
the retailers on the negligent claims and the jury finding no liabil-
ity for the defendants on the other theories, because the jury
believed Dale and his employer to be negligent.' 08 When the dis-
trict court denied the Oaneses' motion for a new trial, the Oaneses
appealed the denial and the judgment, alleging that the court
failed to inform the jury of the applicable law.50 °
The Supreme Court of North Dakota first considered the
Oaneses' contention that the jury instructions on alterations or
modifications did not comport with section 28-01.1-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.), which provides a defense to
manufactures or sellers of products that are altered or modified. 1 0
Reviewing the legislative history of section 28-01.1-04 of the
N.D.C.C. and the relevant case law, the court concluded that the
jury instructions on this statutory defense did not properly inform
the jury that if the modifications to the product were foreseeable
then the use of the defense was precluded. 1 1
Secondly, the Oaneses contended that the jury instruction
given on negligent design was an incorrect statement of the
law. 12 The court disagreed and concluded that the jury instruc-
tion on negligent design, which required the Oaneses to prove
that the auger was "defective and unreasonably dangerous" in
order to find liability, was correct because the instruction prop-
erly focused on the element of defectiveness.5 13
The Oaneses' third attack on the jury instructions alleged that
the instructions "improperly injected negligence principles into
their strict liability claim. '5 1 4 The court agreed, concluding that
the instructions improperly focused the jury on the "knowledge or
reasonableness" of the defendant, instead of properly focusing the
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Oanes, 476 N.W.2d at 250-51.
509. Id. at 251.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 252.
512. Id.
513. Oanes, 476 N.W.2d at 253.
514. Id.
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jury on the adequacy of warnings on the product, to determine if
the production was "unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary
user."
515
Fourth, the supreme court agreed that the jury instruction on
the strict liability claim of unforeseeable misuse was improper
because it may have created a "mistaken impression about the
applicability of that defense. ' 516 The court concluded that "on
retrial," an instruction on misuse would be more complete if it
informed the jury that they could allocate the percentage of fault
"proximately caused" by each of the parties.517
The Oaneses also contended that the jury instructions improp-
erly informed the jury that under both strict liability and negli-
gence, a manufacturer had "no duty to warn if the danger was
obvious ... ."518 The court concluded that these instructions were
erroneous because the issue of obviousness of the danger was only
a factor to find liability under both theories, and obviousness alone
was not meant to preclude liability.519
Finally, the court held that the directed verdict granted for
the seller on the negligent claims was improper.520 The court
reached this conclusion based on evidence that the seller may
have been negligent in selling the auger without adequate warn-
ings and that case law has held that sellers generally have a duty to
warn of the dangerous propensities of products which the seller
knew or should have known about.521 The court therefore
ordered a new trial and vacated the prior judgment and order
denying a new trial.5 22
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
State v. Gruchalla
Mr. Gruchalla, in State v. Gruchalla,2 3 appealed the decision
of the lower court. The district court had refused to allow Mr.
Gruchalla an in camera hearing to determine his eligibility to
receive court appointed counsel.5 24
515. Id.
516. Id. at 254.
517. Id.
518. Oanes, 476 N.W.2d at 254.
519. Id. at 255.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id. Justice Meschke dissented, arguing that the court's conclusion that the
instructions did not inject negligent concepts into the strict liability failure-to-warn claim
was erroneous. Id. (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting in the result).
523. 467 N.W.2d 451 (N.D. 1991).
524. State v. Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d 451 (N.D. 1991).
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An order to show cause hearing was held on December 8,
1989 to determine whether Mr. Gruchalla should be held in con-
tempt for failure to make court-ordered child support pay-
ments.52 5 During the hearing, Mr. Gruchalla requested that he be
awarded court-appointed counsel to assist him in his contempt
defense. 2 6 The district court agreed to provide Mr. Gruchalla
with court-appointed counsel if he could show that he was indi-
gent.527 Mr. Gruchalla refused to provide evidence regarding his
indigent status, claiming that a forced disclosure of such informa-
tion violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.52 8
Gruchalla stated that he would present evidence and testimony to
prove his indigence at an in camera hearing.5 29 The trial court
denied Gruchalla's request for an in camera hearing, and subse-
quently, for court appointed counsel. 530 Mr. Gruchalla appealed
the trial court's denial.53 '
In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court cited Ameri-
can State Bank of Dickinson v. Stoltz.53 2 The court in Stoltz stated
that "there is no blanket Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
answer questions.15 3 3 However, the court stated that in Mr.
Gruchalla's case, any disclosure of facts relative to his status as an
indigent could be used to incriminate him in the contempt pro-
ceedings.534 Therefore, Mr. Gruchalla should have been given "an
opportunity to prove his indigence during an in camera hear-
ing,,35 in front of a judge independent of the judge participating
in the contempt proceedings.536 If Mr. Gruchalla could prove his
indigence during the in camera proceedings, he would be entitled
to have counsel appointed at the expense of the state. 3 7 Counsel
would only be appointed to defend him in the contempt proceed-
ings, if the proceedings would likely result in a deprivation of Mr.
Gruchalla's physical liberty.5 3 8
Justice Levine concurred specially with the court's deci-
525. Id. at 452.
526. Id. at 452-53.
527. Id. at 453.
528. Id.
529. Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d at 453.
530. Id. at 453.
531. Id. at 452.
532. 345 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1984).
533. American State Bank of Dickinson v. Stoltz, 345 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D. 1984).
534. Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d at 455.
535. ld.
536. Id. at 456.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 453.
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sion.539 However, Justice Levine disagreed with the court's find-ing that Mr. Gruchalla was automatically entitled to a full in
540 Lvn
camera proceeding on the issue of his indigence. Justice Levine
stated that Mr. Gruchalla should be required to show that the dis-
closure of information relating to his indigence poses a "real and
appreciable danger of incrimination" before he is granted a full in
camera hearing on the issue of indigence.54 '
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
State v. Everson
In State v. Everson, 42 the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of Keith Everson and found that the check-
point used to stop Everson complied with the Fourth Amendment
requirements, and the evidence presented in the trial court sup-
ported the conclusion that Everson voluntarily consented to a
search of his car.543
North Dakota law enforcement officers set up a checkpoint on
U.S. Highway 12 near Belfield on August 5-6 and 13-14, 1989.s44
The state characterized this checkpoint as multipurpose although
it was actually set up to "attempt to alleviate the problem of drugs
being transported by vehicle, on state highways" prior to and at
the conclusion of the Sturgis, South Dakota motorcycle rally.545 At
the checkpoint, every vehicle was stopped by a point man.5 46 The
point man then would determine if the vehicle should be sent to
the vehicle inspection area, based on the appearance of "indica-
tors" that would lead the officer to believe the driver was carrying
contraband.5 47 Everson was stopped at the checkpoint on August
13, 1989, on his way back to Williston from Sturgis, South
Dakota.548 Everson's license plate on his cycle trailer was partially
broken off, therefore, he was sent to the inspection area.5 49 The
inspection officer testified that he then asked Everson to pull over
to the side of the road so that other vehicles could get by while he
ran a license check for the plate on Everson's trailer.5  The
539. Grunchalla, 467 N.W.2d at 456 (Levine, J., concurring specially).
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991).
543. State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 701-04 (N.D. 1991).
544. Id. at 696.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 697.
548. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 697.
549. Id.
550. Id.
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officer testified that during a conversation between Everson and
the officer, the officer asked Everson if he would consent to a
search of his vehicle and Everson said yes. 55 ' Everson then signed
a consent form.552 The search resulted in the discovery of
methamphetamine and hashish. Everson was arrested and
charged with possession of a controlled substance. 3 The trial
court convicted Everson based on the evidence found in the vehi-
cle search. 5 4 The trial court determined that although the check
point, at which Everson was stopped, was unconstitutional because
of its pretextual nature, and although the point man had unre-
strained discretion to send vehicles to the search area or the
inspection area, 555 Everson's valid uncoerced consent to the
search "purged any taint of illegality stemming from the initial
stop.55
Everson appealed his conviction, claiming that the evidence
against him was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.557 The state first asserted that the pretextual nature of the
stop did not in itself make the check point unconstitutional.,5 5 8
The supreme court agreed and cited People v. Bartley55 9 in which
the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that, "[t]he official subterfuge
with respect to the true purpose of the roadblock is not entitled to
significant weight . .. .,, 0
The North Dakota Supreme Court next applied a balancing
test to the facts of the case, weighing the state's interest in eradi-
cating the problem of narcotics trafficking, against the severity of
the interference with Mr. Everson's individual liberty.5 61 Everson
conceded that the state had a compelling and important interest
in alleviating drug trafficking, but he argued that the checkpoint
was "operated in a haphazard manner" and that the uncon-
strained discretion of the point man to send vehicles to the search
area, along with the fact that the checkpoint's effectiveness was
minimal, made the state's interference with his individual liberty,
greater than the state's interest.5 62 The supreme court disagreed
551. Id. at 698.
552. Id.
553. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 698.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 700.
559. Id. at 701 (citing 486 N.E.2d 880 (Il1. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986)).
560. Id. (quoting Bartley, 486 N.E.2d at 888).
561. Id. at 699.
562. Id. at 701-02.
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finding that: (1) the checkpoints were organized with sufficient
supervisory control;5 63 and (2) the point man did not have uncon-
strained discretion, as he was only instructed to send to the search
area vehicles in which he observed "possible illegal activity.
5 64
Lastly, the court looked to the question raised regarding Ever-
son's alleged consent to be searched. Because the court found that
the initial stop and subsequent detention of Mr. Everson was con-
stitutional, they did not address in detail "the trial court's determi-
nation that a voluntary, uncoerced consent to search purges any
illegality of the original stop."' 565 In order to determine that the
stop was voluntary, the court looked to the trial court's review of
the totality of the circumstances.56 6 The record showed that the
trial court had looked to the fact that Everson was asked to con-
sent to the search of his vehicle, by a single police officer "without
any threat or show of force... in a less-coercive vehicle inspection
area." 567 The trial court also found that Everson was of ordinary
intelligence and that he understood what was happening when he
allowed the officers to search his vehicle.
568
The court concluded that the evidence used against Everson
was not obtained through unconstitutional means; and therefore,
it was rightly allowed into evidence.5 69 Accordingly, the convic-
tion against Everson was affirmed.57 °
Justice Levine dissented, agreeing with the trial court's find-
ing that the initial stop was unconstitutional.5 71 Levine further
believed that because of the illegality of the stop, the consent was
tainted and thus could not be used to purge the taint of the uncon-
stitutional stop.5
72
Justice Meschke concurred, agreeing with the rationale of the
trial court that the initial stop was unconstitutional but that the
later "uncoerced consent purged the illegality of the original
stop. 573
563. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 702.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 703.
566. Id. at 704.
567. Id.
568. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 704.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Id. at 705 (Levine, J., dissenting).
572. Id.
573. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 706 (Meschke, J., concurring).
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Leadbetter v. Rose
In Leadbetter v. Rose, 74 a University of North Dakota stu-
dent, Mary Leadbetter, sued a professor, Dr. Richard Rose, and
the University of North Dakota (UND).5 75 Leadbetter's allegations
were that Rose sexually assaulted her while attending a biology
convention in New Orleans and that UND "breached their duty to
investigate her complaint and to provide her with a safe school
environment and supervisors.15 76  UND moved to dismiss by
invoking sovereign immunity and the district court granted the
motion. 77 Leadbetter appealed.578
First, Leadbetter contended that sovereign immunity did not
bar her action because UND was "not an arm of the State of North
Dakota. '5 79 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that
UND was an arm of the state based on several factors. °80 One fac-
tor was that any judgment against UND would have to be paid out
of the state treasury or other state funds.58 ' Hence, the state was
the "real party in interest" and was allowed to invoke sovereign
immunity.58 2 Other factors demonstrated that UND, after all, was
under the control of the state.583 This was evidenced through the
North Dakota Constitution and North Dakota's statutes.58 4
Secondly, Leadbetter argued that the supreme court could or
should "abrogate or modify the doctrine of sovereign immunity"
because the reasons for retaining the doctrine are antiquated. 85
The North Dakota Supreme Court found, based on the language in
Article I, Section 9, of the North Dakota Constitution, that sover-
eign immunity could not be "judicially abrogated."58 6 Instead, the
574. 467 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 1991).
575. Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 432 (N.D. 1991).
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 432.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 433. Other factors were whether the university could sue or be sued and
whether the university was separately incorporated. Id.
584. Id. See also N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 and § 6 (demonstrating that the state has
absolute and exclusive control over universities supported by public taxes and a state board
of higher education administers and controls the universities); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 15-10-01
to -16 (1981 & Supp. 1991) (providing that the state has control over the board and the
board's duties).
585. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 434.
586. Id. See also N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("All courts shall be open .... Suits may be
brought against the state in such a manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the
legislative assembly may, by law, direct.").
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supreme court believed the constitutional provision "entrusted"
or "delegated" the ability to abrogate or modify sovereign immu-
nity to the legislature. 8 7 In the alternative, Leadbetter further
argued that the open courts provision of the North Dakota Consti-
tution gave a person an absolute right to redress a wrong. s The
court pointed out that the second sentence in Article I, Section 9,
"specifically limit[ed]" the first sentence, and thus the open courts
provision was not absolute. 8 9
Thirdly, Leadbetter argued that absolute sovereign immunity
violated the equal protection clauses of both the United States and
North Dakota Constitutions by creating an unfair classification. 590
The supreme court stated that classifications under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity were "generally" upheld under the rational-
basis test because the classifications were related to legitimate gov-
ernmental interests.591
Finally, Leadbetter asserted that "sovereign immunity unduly
impinges on her right to travel and places an undue burden on
interstate commerce."'5 92 The supreme court found this argument
unpersuasive since Leadbetter cited no convincing authority to
support the allegation.59 3 The judgment of the district court,
which barred the suit by state sovereign immunity, was
affirmed.59 a
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
City of Fargo v. Little Brown Jug
In City of Fargo v. Little Brown Jug,595 (LBJ) the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that city ordinances may be effective
in areas where the state has legislated, as long as the city has
authority pursuant to state law.596
The City of Fargo brought criminal charges against LBJ charg-
ing a violation of a city ordinance for selling alcoholic beverages to
persons under the age of twenty-one, a class B misdemeanor, even
587. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 434.
588. Id. at 435.
589. Id. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("suits may be brought against the state in such a
manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct.").
590. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 436.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 437.
593. Id.
594. Id. In dissent, Justice Meschke vehemently contended that sovereign immunity
has "no place" in the free society of today, because it was "outmoded and undemocratic."
Id. at 437-38 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
595. 468 N.w.2d 392 (N.D. 1991).
596. City of Fargo v. Little Brown Jug, 468 N.W.2d 392, 396 (N.D. 1991).
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though a state law regulated the same offense and provided pun-
ishment as a class A misdemeanor.5 9 7 LBJ asserted on a motion to
dismiss that the Fargo ordinance was invalid because it violated
section 12.1-01-05 of the North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.),
which prohibits municipal ordinances from superseding state
law. 59
8
In this instance, section 40-05-01(29) of the N.D.C.C. gave the
city authority to legislate the activity of dispensing alcoholic bev-
erages and section 40-05-06(1) limited the penalty a city may
impose for violating a city ordinance covering the activity.599 In
order to give meaningful effect to each statute, the court sought to
avoid section 12.1-01-05 of the N.D.C.C. from impliedly repealing
these statutes by concluding that the statutes should be read
together and should be "harmonized." 6 °0 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the city and the state may have identi-
cally defined offenses with differing penalties, so long as the city
has a lesser penalty and the city has the statutory authority to reg-
ulate the activity.601 The court reversed and remanded for a trial
on the merits.60 2
TAXATION
State v. Quill Corporation
The North Dakota State Tax Commissioner commenced an
action for declaratory judgment against Quill Corporation in State
v. Quill Corp.6 °3 The district court granted Quill Corporation's
motion for summary judgment and the State of North Dakota, by
the tax commissioner, appealed to the North Dakota Supreme
597. Id. at 394-95. The Fargo city ordinance made the selling, servicing, or the
dispensing of alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of twenty-one by a licensee a
class B misdemeanor. Id. at 394. The class B misdemeanor carried a penalty of a fine not to
exceed $500, or imprisonment not to exceed 30 days, or both. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 5-02-06 (1989) (the similar state law prohibiting the same offense provided for a greater
penalty, a class A misdemeanor with a maximum fine of $1,000, imprisonment for up to one
year, or both).
598. Little Brown Jug, 468 N.W.2d at 393. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-05 (1989)
(prohibits cities from passing ordinances that supersede crimes defined by state law).
599. Little Brown Jug, 468 N.W.2d at 395. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01(29) (1989)
(giving municipalities the power to regulate the use and licensure of alcoholic beverages);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-06(1) (1989) (limiting the municipality's power to penalize
violations of its ordinances).
600. Little Brown Jug, 468 N.W.2d at 395. In dissent, Justice Vande Walle argued that
section 12.1-01-05 of the N.D.C.C. impliedly repealed section 40-05-01 (29) of the N.D.C.C.
because the legislative intent was for a higher penalty and the statutes were irreconcilable.
Id. (Vande Walle, J., dissenting). Justice Vande Walle believed that this interpretation of
the two statutes would avoid any equal protection problems. Id. at 397.
601. Id. at 396.
602. Id.
603. 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991).
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Court.6 o4
Quill Corporation, a Delaware corporation which sells by tele-
phone and mail order to nearly 3,500 North Dakota customers for
a profit of just under $1,000,000 annually, had refused to collect
and remit use taxes on goods purchased by the North Dakota con-
sumers, pursuant to section 57-40.2-07 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code (N.D.C.C.).60 1 Section 57-40.2-07 requires that "a
retailer maintaining a business in this state16 0 6 collect use taxes
from its customers and remit them to the state.607 North Dakota
argued that Quill Corporation is "a retailer maintaining a business
in this state '60 8 as defined under subsection seven of N.D.C.C. sec-
tion 57-40.2-01.609 Subsection seven states that a "retailer . . .
includes every person who engages in regular and systematic solic-
itation of sales of tangible personal property. 6 10 According to sec-
tion 81-04.10-01-03.1(3) of the North Dakota Administrative Code,
-regular and systematic solicitation" is the transmission of three or
more separate advertisements over a twelve-month period. 11
Because Quill distributes approximately 230,000 separate adver-
tisements each year to its North Dakota customers, they are "a
retailer maintaining a place of business in this state" under
N.D.C.C. section 57-40.2-07 and the tax commissioner argued that
they should be required to pay the use taxes collected from the
North Dakota customers.6 12 Quill argued that subsections (6) and
(7) of section 57-40.2-01 of the N.D.C.C., which define a retailer,
are unconstitutional as applied to Quill. 61 3 Quill argued that these
subsections violate the Due Process Clause, as well as Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. 4 The district court agreed with Quill
and granted summary judgment.6 1' The State of North Dakota,
through the tax commissioner, appealed.6 16
Quill argued that under the standard set forth in National Bel-
las Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,617 the State of North
Dakota had failed to establish the nexus between Quill and North
604. State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (1991).
605. Id. at 204-05.
606. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (1991).
607. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 205.
608. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01 (1991).
609. Id. § 47-40.2-01(7).
610. Id.
611. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81.04.1-01-03.1 (1988).
612. Quill Corp, 470 N.W.2d at 205.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 205-06.
616. Id. at 206.
617. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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Dakota necessary for constitutional imposition of the use tax.6 18
Bellas Hess involved a mail order corporation, similar to the corpo-
ration involved in the case at hand.6 19 In Bellas Hess, the United
States Supreme Court stated that in order for a use tax to be found
constitutional as applied to mail order sellers, there must be "some
definite link, some minimum connection, between the state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."16 20 The Court
in Bellas Hess found that the corporation did not have sufficient
contacts with the state to enable them to require payment of use
taxes. 621 The Court also noted that requiring Bellas Hess to pay a
use tax, in all the states it did its mail order business, would put a
"substantial administrative burden" on it.62 2
The North Dakota Supreme Court attempted to apply the
Bellas Hess rationale to the facts of the Quill case.62 3 However,
the court found that it could not simply accept the rule set out in
Bellas Hess without also looking at the tremendous social, eco-
nomic, commercial, and legal innovations which have occurred
since the decision in Bellas Hess.62 4 The North Dakota Supreme
Court also discussed numerous cases which, although not factually
identical to Bellas Hess, chipped away at the nexus concept set out
in Bellas Hess.625 In these cases, the United States Supreme Court
not only expanded the nexus concept, but also recognized the
purely administrative nature of the collection duty in use tax cases
and indicated that a lower threshold may suffice in such cases. 26
The post-Bellas Hess Supreme Court cases also stressed the eco-
nomic presence of a corporation in the taxing state, rather than its
personal contacts. In light of these cases, the North Dakota
Supreme Court found that it was required to apply Belle Hess in a
contemporary context.627
Based on the facts in the case at hand as applied to the nexus
requirements set out in recent United States Supreme Court case
law, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that Quill should be
required to collect and submit use taxes to the State of North
618. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 205 (citing National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1967).
619. Id. at 206.
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 206.
623. Id.
624. Id. at 208.
625. Id. at 209-13.
626. Id. at 213-14.
627. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 215.
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Dakota.6" The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Quill had
a significant economic presence in North Dakota and was pro-
vided sufficient protections and benefits, to justify the imposition
of the duty of collection and submission of the use taxes.629
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dickinson Econo-Storage
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dickinson Econo-Storage,630 the
North Dakota Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiff, finding that the words, "other person" used in section 57-
45-01 of the North Dakota Century Code refered to persons of the
same general class as occupants and tenants.631 As a result, the
court held that the plaintiff (mortgagee) fell within the class of peo-
ple entitled to reimbursement of property taxes that they paid,
which ought to have been paid by someone else.632 The someone
else in the case at hand was the property owner (mortgagor), Dick-
inson Econo-Storage.633
Midwest Federal was granted a mortgage of 80 feet of Lot 3,
Block 2A, Kilwein's 2nd Subdivision by the owner of the property,
Econo-Storage. 63 4 On March 20, 1986, Econo-Storage defaulted
on the loan and Midwest obtained a judgment of foreclosure.635
The West 80 feet of Lot 3 was conveyed to Midwest.636 The
remainder of Lot 3 and all of Lot 4 had separate mortgages with
different mortgagees.637 In August of 1986, Midwest Federal paid
the total unpaid real estate taxes on Lots 3 and 4.638 Midwest then
brought an action to recover the taxes paid on the portion of Lot 3
which they did not own.639 Midwest was granted summary judg-
ment by the trial court.64 ° On appeal, however, the judgment was
reversed and remanded.64 ' On remand the district court allowed
Resolution Trust Corporation (R.T.C.), to be substituted as plaintiff
and permitted them to recover the taxes paid on the mortgaged
property.6 42 An appeal by Econo-Storage followed.6 43
628. Id. at 219.
629. Id.
630. 474 N.w.2d 50 (N.D. 1991).
631. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dickinson Econo-Storage, 474 N.W.2d 50, 54 (N.D.
1991).
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Id at 51.
635. Id.
636. Resolution Trust Corp., 474 N.W.2d at 51.
637. Id.
638. Id.
639. Id. at 52.
640. Id.
641. Resolution Trust Corp., 474 N.W.2d at 52.
642. Id.
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On appeal, Econo-Storage argued that Midwest was not "any
other person" who could recover the real estate taxes paid under
57-45-01.644 R.T.C. argued that "'any other person' must be read
literally, so that any person could pay the real estate taxes on any
piece of property and receive a money judgment against the
owner or other responsible party. ' 645 The North Dakota Supreme
Court disagreed with both interpretations of the statute. The
court specifically stated that accepting R.T.C.'s interpretation
would lead to absurd and illogical results. 6 To avoid such results,
the court applied the rule of ejusdem generis to interpret the
words of the statute. Ejusdem generis states that "general words
are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects specifically enumerated. '641 In applying this principle to
the words "other person," which in context reads "any occupant
or tenant or any other person," the phrase "other person" refers to
"'other persons of the same general class as occupants and ten-
ants. '648 More specifically, the court construed other persons to
mean "others persons with some interest in or connection with the
subject property.' 649 The court found that Midwest, and conse-
quently R.T.C., did have an interest in the property, due to the
fact that all of Lots 3 and 4 were considered one tract for tax
purposes.65 °
Econo-Storage also alleged that section 57-45-01 does not
allow for recovery through a money judgment.65 ' The court
found that this interpretation of the statute would clearly ignore
the statute's plain language.652
Lastly, Econo-Storage asserted that a summary judgment was
improper because a material issue of fact remained as to whether
or not Midwest's payment of the tax was a mistake.65 3 The court
found this immaterial because section 57-45-01 made no distinc-
tion between taxes paid intentionally or by mistake.65 4 Summary
judgment for R. T. C. was therefore affirmed.655
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Resolution Trust Corp., 474 N.W.2d at 52.
647. Id.
648. Id. at 53.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 53-54.
651. Resolution Trust Corp., 474 N.W.2d at 54.
652. Id.
653. ld.
654. Id.
655. Id.
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WILLS
In re Estate of Stanton
In In re Estate of Stanton,656 the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the district court, finding that the
contestant of Mr. Stanton's will, Ms. Agnes Gassman, did not
clearly and convincingly show that Mr. Stanton's will was invalid.
Mr. Stanton, a life long bachelor, died on January 20, 1989,
without issue.65 '7 His will named his three brothers, Francis, Miles
and Victor as beneficiaries, but did not name either his sister,
Agnes, or his fourth brother, Lawrence.65 " Agnes filed an objec-
tion to probate of the will alleging forgery, fraud, undue influence,
incompetency, absence of due execution and revocation by the
testator.65 9 Summary judgment was granted to the personal rep-
resentative of the will, against the objections made by Agnes.660
On appeal, Agnes claimed that summary judgment was granted in
err, as she had presented sufficient evidence to show that there
remained a genuine issue of material fact to be considered by the
court.
6 6 1
A summary judgment should be granted only if it appears that
no genuine issue of material fact may be drawn from the evi-
dence. 662 The party moving for a summary judgment has the bur-
den of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact
exists.6 6
3
Agnes asserted two major theories in the case. Either, that
the will offered was not executed on its purported date in 1974,
but was actually executed in 1977, after Mr. Stanton's stroke
through undue influence, forgery or fraudulent means;664 or that
the will was executed in 1974, whereby it would be invalid as Mr.
Stanton lacked testamentary capacity in 1974.665 In the alterna-
tive, Ms. Gassman asserted that, even if the will was signed in
1974, it was later revoked.666
Within the 1974 will was an attestation clause signed by
656. 472 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1991).
657. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 743 (N.D. 1991).
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. N.D. R. EvID. 56(c).
663. Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D. 1985).
664. Stanton, 472 N.W.2d at 743.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 743-44.
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Edward and Marliss Peterson.667 The clause attested to the fact
that the will was subscribed, published and declared by Mr. Leo
Edward Stanton.668 In reviewing Stanton's will, the court applied
the established rule that,"recitals in an attestation clause of a will
are assumed to be true and are used to establish due execution
unless the presumption of truth is overcome by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 66 9
The evidence presented by Agnes was not sufficiently clear
and convincing to overcome that presumption of due execu-
tion.670 Agnes attempted to submit an affidavit signed by Agnes'
son, John, which stated that Victor, one of the beneficiaries of the
will, informed him that Miles had made a will for Leo Stanton in
1980.671 This affidavit was inadmissible based on the hearesay
rules.672 Agnes attempted to get John's affidavit admitted through
a hearesay exception-Rule 804(bX3).673 Rule 804(bX3) allows for
admission of evidence if the statement made was against pecuni-
ary interests.674 The statement was made against Victor's interest
as a beneficiary of Mr. Leo Stanton's will, however, the affidavit
was not admitted.675 Admission under this rule required that
Victor, as declarant, be unavailable for testimony. 6  Victor was
available and also submitted a deposition to the court.677
Agnes also attempted to get in evidence her own testimony
that Leo told her that he had no will.6 78 The court noted that the
evidence was clearly inadmissible hearesay.679 The court stated
that Agnes' remaining admissible evidence was not convincing
enough to find the 1974 will invalid for any of the alleged rea-
sons. Therefore, the court found that the 1974 will was duly
executed.68'
Agnes' contention, that Leo Stanton lacked the testamentary
capacity to validly execute his will, also failed. 8 2 She failed to
establish the existence of an element essential to her case. Agnes
667. Id. at 744.
668. Id.
669. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735 (N.D. 1986).
670. Stanton, 472 N.W.2d at 744.
671. Id. at 744-45.
672. Id. at 745.
673. N.D. R. EvID. 804.
674. Id.
675. Stanton, 472 N.W.2d at 745.
676. N.D. R. EVID. 804.
677. Stanton, 472 N.W.2d at 745.
678. Id.
679. Id.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Stanton, 472 N.W.2d at 746.
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failed to rebut the presumption of Leo Stanton's testamentary
capacity. Agnes based her contention that Leo was incapacitated
on her belief that Leo was drinking heavily at the time his will was
executed in 1974 and because he chose Edward Peterson to wit-
ness his will.683 The court found Agnes' contentions to be without
merit.684 The court noted that frequent drinking is not proof of
lack of testamentary capacity and found it conceivable that Leo
Stanton would ask Mr. Edward Peterson to witness his will
because the two were old friends.685
Lastly, Agnes alleged that Leo revoked his 1974 will by
"crumpling" up a copy of the will presented to him by Agnes' son,
John.686 Under section 30.1-08-07(2) of the North Dakota Century
Code, revocation may be completed by mutilating the will with
the intent to revoke.6 8 7 Crumpling of a copy, instead of the origi-
nal, is ineffectual as an act of revocation regardless of intent.688 For
the reasons discussed above, the court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment.689
Justice Levine concurred with the court's opinion. 9 ° Justice
Levine reiterated the fact that the standard for deciding summary
judgment was "whether the evidence presents sufficient disagree-
ment to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law." 69 1 In this case,
Levine found that the "scintilla" of evidence in support of the con-
testant was not enough to defeat summary judgment.69 2
WORKERS COMPENSATION
Kopp v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
In Kopp v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau,69 3
the issues were whether the claimant should carry the burden of
proving that the claimant was still disabled upon the Bureaus ter-
mination of benefits, and whether the Bureau's findings of no disa-
bility were supported by the preponderance of the evidence. 694
683. Id.
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07 (1991).
688. In re D'Agostino's Will, 75 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1950).
689. Stanton, 472 N.W.2d at 747.
690. Id. at 747 (Levine, J., concurring specially).
691. Id. at 748.
692. Id.
693. 462 N.W.2d 132 (N.D. 1990).
694. Kopp v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 462 N.W.2d 132, 133
(N.D. 1990).
1992] 815
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
When Victor Kopp filed a claim for workers compensation
benefits in November of 1985, the Bureau provided benefits for
"related medical and disability" costs pertaining to a rotator cuff
tear in Kopp's shoulder.69 5 In February of 1989, the Bureau
stopped making payments because they believed that he was no
longer disabled.696 This decision was followed up by a termination
order on March 5, 1987.697 The district court ordered the Bureau
to reconsider its termination decision after a psychological evalua-
tion was provided by a doctor.698 Upon review of the evidence,
the Bureau affirmed its earlier decisions denying the benefits.699
Kopp appealed. 70 0 The district court held that Kopp was entitled
to benefits that accrued at the time of the initial termination of
benefits until March of 1988, because the Bureau failed to provide
due process prior to termination, but affirmed the termination of
further benefits. 70 ' As a result, Kopp appealed, maintaining that
he should not have had to bear the burden of proving that he was
disabled, that he was entitled to continued benefits and that the
Bureau's findings were not based on the preponderance of
evidence.70 2
Although Kopp demonstrated that other jurisdictions placed
the burden of proof on the Bureau, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota stated that "Worker's Compensation statutes are purely
statutory and that the rationale of other courts in construing provi-
sions of their workers compensation statutes is inapplicable when
our laws do not contain a counterpart provision. "703 The court
concluded that North Dakota law places the burden on the claim-
ant to prove the right to receive continued benefits. 0
Next, the court noted that upon review of administrative deci-
sion the court must affirm the Bureau's findings unless the findings
were not supported by a preponderance of evidence.70 5 Upon
review of the Bureau's findings of fact, the court held that the
Bureau's decision was supported by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and that reasonable minds could have easily concluded,
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Id. Kopp requested a rehearing which was granted and held in January of 1988.
Id. At the hearing, the Bureau considered the depositions of Kopp's doctors and decided to
affirm the earlier order denying benefits. Id.
698. Id. at 137.
699. Kopp, 462 N.W.2d at 133.
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Id. at 134.
704. Kopp, 462 N.W.2d at 135.
705. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1991) (noting the standard of review).
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through the factual findings, that Kopp failed to prove he was dis-
abled.7 0 6 The district court's judgment was affirmed. 70 7
In his dissent, Justice Meschke firmly believed that the Bureau
should carry the burden of proving that Kopp was not disabled
before discontinuing his benefits.70 8 Justice Meschke believed that
it is well established that the burden is always placed on the mov-
ing party who wishes to change continuing benefits in order to
prevent erroneous and arbitrary results.70 9
F.O.E. Aerie 2337 v. Workers Compensation Bureau
In F. O.E. Aerie 2337 v. Workers Compensation Bureau,7 1 the
court affirmed the decision of the district court. The district court
had affirmed the decision of the North Dakota Workers Compen-
sation Bureau which refused to force the reimbursement of bene-
fits paid to an employee of the club, Kania, but barred him from
receiving any further benefits.71l
On October 22, 1987, Kania fell down some steps while work-
ing at the F.O.E. Aerie 2337, a/k/a The Eagles Club.7 12 Kania
filed a claim with the Workers Compensation Bureau based on the
accident.71 3 Kania indicated that he had injured his back and hip
in the fall.7 1 4 Kania also stated that he had no back problems prior
to the accident at the Eagles Club.71- The Bureau paid all of
Kania's medical expenses and disability benefits until August
1988.16 At that time the Bureau issued an amended order which
allowed for continued payment of Kania's medical expenses and
payment of a retraining program for Kania.71 7 In response to this
new order, the Eagles Club requested a formal rehearing on the
matter.718 The hearing revealed that Kania had "made a false
statement concerning his prior medical history of low back"
problems.719 Based on this finding, the Bureau concluded that
706. Kopp, 462 N.W.2d at 139. In concurrence, Justice Levine believed that when
there is evidence favorable to the claimant, the Agency should explain the reason for
disregarding it. Id. at 140 (Levine, J., concurring in the result).
707. Kopp, 462 N.W.2d at 140.
708. Id. (Meschke, J., dissenting).
709. Id.
710. 464 N.W.2d 197 (N.D. 1990).
711. F.O.E. Aerie 2337 v. Workers Comp. Bureau, 464 N.W.2d 197 (N.D. 1990).
712. Id. at 198.
713. Id.
714. Id.
715. Id.
716. F.O.E. Aerie 2337, 464 N.W.2d at 198.
717. Id.
718. Id.
719. Id.
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they would not require Kania to repay the money already paid to
him, but that he would have to forfeit any additional benefits rela-
tive to the back injury.72 °
The district court affirmed the decision of the Bureau and
both parties appealed the decision to the supreme court. The
Eagles Club argued that Kania should be required to reimburse
them for the benefits he received based on section 65-05-33 of the
North Dakota Century Code.7 2 1 Section 65-05-33 requires a claim-
ant to reimburse the Bureau for any benefits paid based on a false
statement in the claim.7 2 Kania argued that the Bureau had
found his false statement immaterial regarding to the benefits
already paid and therefore, according to section 65-05-33, the false
statement must be considered immaterial regarding all future
benefits.723
The supreme court held that both the Eagles Club's and
Kania's interpretation of section 65-05-33 of the North Dakota
Century Code were extreme and that the "Bureau reasonably
determined that Kania's false statement was sufficiently material
to support forfeiture of future benefits," but "not material enough
to cause the Bureau to pay initial benefits. 7 24
Justice Vande Walle concurred specially to note that "if mate-
riality were to be a test not only for repayment of past benefits but
for a denial of future benefits as well," the test would be met in
Kania's case.7
ZONING AND PLANNING
Gullickson v. Stark County Commissioners
In Gullickson v. Stark County Commissioners,26 Calvin and
Coreen Wahl acquired a zoning permit and moved a mobile home
onto their lot in the Greenvale I Subdivision, Stark County, North
Dakota.727 Inadvertently, the Assistant Zoning Commissioner
issued a permit, relying on a 1964 zoning ordinance and not the
applicable 1983 zoning ordinance which specifically prohibited
mobile homes in the subdivision.72 " The Commissioners granted a
variance, which allowed the Wahls to place their mobile home on
720. Id. at 199.
721. F.O.E. Aerie 2337, 464 N.W.2d at 200.
722. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-33 (1985).
723. F.O.E. Aerie 2337, 464 N.W.2d at 200.
724. Id. at 201.
725. Id. (Vande Walle, J., concurring specially).
726. 474 N.W.2d 890 (1991).
727. Gullickson v. Stark County Comm'rs, 474 N.W.2d 890, 891 (N.D. 1991).
728. Id.
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their lot.729 Appellants, who were residents of the subdivision,
challenged the Commissioners decision, contending that it vio-
lated the zoning ordinance.7 30 Although the district court
affirmed the Commissioners' decision, appellants appealed con-
tending the district court should have looked at more evidence.7 3
The Supreme Court of North Dakota stated that judicial
review of Commission decisions was "limited to determining if the
decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 7 32 Further-
more, the court noted that the scope of review permited the court
to "independently determine" if the Commissioners correctly
interpreted and applied the law.733 The failure of the Commis-
sioners to have done so would allow the court to overrule the
Commissioners' decision. 34
A variance is granted by the Commissioners, in special cir-
cumstances, to protect against the unnecessary hardship brought
by a strict enforcement of the zoning ordinance.735 The unneces-
sary hardship must stem from circumstances unique to the land
and not the applicant.736 The standards, which usually must be
met to get a variance, consist of: " '1. no adverse effect on the pub-
lic, 2. no adverse effect on neighbors, and 3. the property has
characteristics making it eligible for a variance.' ,,737 The court
noted that the Stark County Zoning Ordinance had incorporated
these standards.738 Further, the court found "substantial evi-
dence" in the record that a variance, allowing the mobile home in
the subdivision, would depreciate property values in the subdivi-
sion.7 39 Additionally, the court stated the property did not have
the characteristics making it eligible for a variance.740 First, the
Wahls' land was not any different from the adjacent land in the
subdivision. 41 Second, the hardship endured by the Wahls
related to the Wahls rather than the land.742 Third, allowing the
729. Id. The district court set aside the variance for lack of proper notice and
remanded for further proceedings. Id. After proper notice and a hearing, the
Commissioners regranted the variance. Id.
730. Id. at 892.
731. Id.
732. Gullickson, 474 N.W.2d at 892.
733. Id.
734. Id.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Gullickson, 474 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLAN. & DEV.
CONTROL LAW § 106 (1971)).
738. Id.
739. Id. at 893.
740. Id.
741. Id. at 894.
742. Gullickson, 474 N.W.2d at 894.
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Wahls to place a prohibited structure on the lot would amount to a
privilege, since the other owners may not do so. 743 For these rea-
sons, the court concluded the grant of the variance was "arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable. 744
The court also found that the variance constituted unreasona-
ble spot zoning.745  In this instance, the Commissioners granted
the variance despite explicit language in the zoning ordinance
prohibiting the use.7 46 Consequently, the variance was in direct
conflict with the standards of the zoning ordinance, making the
grant arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.747 The decision of
the Commissioners to grant the variance was reversed. 48
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id. See E. YOKLEY, ZONINc LAw & PRACTICE § 13-2 (4th ed. 1978) (spot zoning
"refers to the singling out of a lot or small area for discriminatory or different treatment
from that accorded surrounding land which is similar in character."); see also City of Fargo
v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1977) (spot zoning undermines the
"essential purpose of zoning: . . . to rationally coordinate land-use planning to promote
orderly development and preservation of property values.").
746. Gullickson, 474 N.W.2d at 893.
747. Id. at 895. See N.D. CENT. CODE. § 11-33-03 (1985) (requiring counties to have
comprehensive development plans and changes must be reflected in the plans). In this
instance, the Commissioners did not amend the standards in the comprehensive plan.
Gullickson, 474 N.W.2d at 895.
748. Gullickson, 474 N.W.2d at 895. In concurrence, Justice Vande Walle agreed with
the majority that spot zoning cannot be used "to favor and to offer special privileges." Id. at
895 (Vande Walle, J., concurring in the result). Additionally, Justice Vande Walle believed
spot zoning was used here to remedy the inadvertent issuance of the permit. Id. Despite
the pragmatic approach, Justice Vande Walle said spot zoning could not be used to remedy
the situation. Id.
